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ABSTRACT 
Chinese digital censorship is both wide-reaching and harmful to U.S. interests. It 
prevents the free flow of information and stifles criticism of governance, social 
movements, and the spread of democratic values. Cryptography has long been a proven 
solution to secure data in transit, but it has one significant flaw: it is not covert, and thus 
is easily detectable. We propose an adaptive steganographic model that is both covert and 
secure and can be implemented with existing messaging platforms. We utilize machine 
learning to create an adaptive model that modifies a steganographic algorithm, making 
steganalysis more difficult. We demonstrate the feasibility of ratcheting and otherwise 
modifying our steganographic model to generate a new solution by reinitializing the final 
layers of the encoder and decoder models, creating at least 100 unique models with low 
cross-decoding compatibility (high decoding bit-error). We show the potential for a tiling 
method of steganographic encoding that exponentially increases encoding capacity but 
likely carries a higher risk of detection via steganalysis. We show that in the 
stego-images examined, the induced changes to the images are concentrated at the edges. 
We demonstrate a significant vulnerability to a novel form of statistical steganalysis in 
(ML) steganography based on the distribution of bit-errors. Finally, we discuss the 
necessary steps and key challenges to implementing our model with an existing 
messaging platform.
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Barriers to communication exist in various forms, such as physical distance, differences in
technology, and local rules and regulations. Although modern telecommunication’s infras-
tructure and the Internet have reduced the impact of physical distance and lack of technology,
local rules and regulations regarding how people communicate with one another remain a
significant communication barrier for many citizens around the world. Our research outlines
the issue of digital censorship, particularly within authoritarian regimes. We discuss current
commonly used methods to subvert censorship and evaluate them. Finally, we propose, test,
and evaluate aMachine Learning (ML) steganographic solution to subvert digital censorship
for use alongside existing messaging applications. This chapter outlines the main premise,
objectives, benefits, and contributions of our research.
1.1 Problem Definition
Digital censorship is commonly used in authoritarian regimes around the world [1]. Even
countries that have been historically regarded as having a “free” internet, such as Nor-
way, have shown increased censorship activity in 2020 [1]. However, the greatest level of
censorship occurs in Russia, Iran, and China [1]. Given China’s recent and economic and
military rise to a peer or near-peer competitor of the United States, there is great concern
that China will export not only its surveillance technology but also its worldview in regard
to restricting internet freedom. Due to the Chinese government’s efforts to prevent, control,
and quell social unrest, it has developed a robust and powerful infrastructure for domestic
surveillance and censorship. As a result, communications via Chinese-developedmessaging
applications and Chinese domestic infrastructure are particularly vulnerable to surveillance
and censorship. Researchers have shown that even international users of WeChat operating
fromoutside of China unwittingly participate in the surveillance and censorshipmechanisms
of the application [2]. International user communications inform the domestic image and
content blacklists thereby enhancing the application’s domestic censorship capabilities [2].
A high degree of surveillance is especially concerning for dissidents, social organizers,
foreign citizens, and non-Han ethnic groups, such as the Uighurs. Therefore we propose an
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adaptive image-based steganographic model for use with censored messaging applications
to circumvent censorship in support of a free and open internet.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this research is to develop and evaluate a model for surveillance
and censorship subversion that can be implemented with existing messaging applications.
The goal is to provide a covert, secure mechanism for sending embedded messages via
an existing communication medium, thereby preserving usability and social networks and
also enabling the further spread of this technology. Given the nature of and general attitude
towards digital censorship in China, our model will be geared toward providing small-scale,
long-term undetectability for a small number of users. That is to say the goal is to protect
directed communications over the long-term vice broadcast communications. Based on our
research, the demand for a privacy-enabled, censorship-circumventing application in China
is only lukewarm [3].
However, those that dowant access to such technology are at significant risk from authorities
and thus long-term secrecy is a desirable feature. Even if the use of steganography is
discovered,message content should be protected via cryptography.At the time of thiswriting
there exists no viable anti-surveillance, anti-censorship messaging application available in
China [4]. Signal is one of the most recently banned applications. The Signal application’s
protocol has strong security guarantees and is utilized in some of themost popularmessaging
applications, includingWhatsApp andFacebookMessenger [5].However, historically,many
Western-developed applications, especially thosewith strong security guarantees, eventually
are banned by the Chinese government.
It is believed that WeChat is so popular and entrenched in the lives of Chinese citizens that it
would be extremely difficult for the government to ban its use outright. For example,WeChat
functionality goes far beyond that of Facebook and WhatsApp and integrates messaging,
social media, digital payments, medical and official business, and educational functions [6].
In other words, it can be thought of as an amalgamation of Facebook, Blackboard, Sakai,
Office365, and Venmo, and probably other applications. For the reason that the application
is so popular and has essentially become indispensable, we choose to develop our model
with the WeChat platform as a backbone with a steganographic framework on top as a
2
means to subvert surveillance and censorship. A steganographic model seeks to hide secret
messages within the noise of normal communications and this platform provides plenty
of noise within which to hide. Although this model could theoretically be applied to any
messaging application, it was developed with the intention of being used in countries that
lack free speech protections and have intrusive surveillance and censorship practices, such
as China. However, Chinese citizens are not the only people at risk from corporate and
government snooping. The steganographic model presented here is meant to be flexible and
support covert communication over any insecure communications channel.
1.3 Benefits of Study
1.3.1 Current Methods of Censorship Circumvention
Although circumventing censorship in China is difficult, there are several options available.
Many internet users in China are familiar with VPNs [3]. However, VPN use is restricted by
the government to certain providers, whom the government presumably has access to their
data. Only users savvy enough to download and use a non-government approved VPN have
a chance of their activity not being monitored by the government. However, those users
have virtually no guarantee that they are not being snooped upon as even supposedly secure
VPNs are not invulnerable to advanced nation-state spying. Besides using VPNs, citizens in
China have few options to circumvent censorship other than meeting in person. Of course,
speaking or writing in some sort of code is an option, but this is only a temporary measure
as authorities usually catch on fairly quickly.
In Chinese internet slang, there are many words that are substituted for near homophones
to convey some sort of additional, hidden meaning. For example, the Chinese word 河蟹
(héxiè; river crab) is a near homophone for 和谐 (héxié; harmony) differing only in tone
(see tone marks) [7]. Government censors can quickly catch on to attempts to mock official
language but are slower to block seemingly innocuous terms, such as river crab. However,
much of the use of these kind of near homophones has been used in a mocking or joking
context and quickly becomes obvious to government censors. However, at its roots, this
kind of wordplay is a very rudimentary form of steganography. You replace a sensitive word
with an innocuous one with similar pronunciation and the likelihood of being censored
decreases. The obvious drawback of this approach is that it is very easy to figure out. Once
3
the connections between homophones are understood, there is no confidentiality and past
messages are vulnerable to censoring. Any modern stego-system would be an improvement
in regard to secrecy.
Besides VPNs and internet slang, there are few other techniques to subvert censorship.
A robust steganographic system that utilizes cryptography would combine clandestine
communication from steganography with all the security guarantees of encryption.
1.3.2 Impact
Any government, organization, or individual that values free speech will benefit from a
means to subvert censorship. From citizens who are casually interested in sharing political
“memes” to those who are determined to exercise collective action in support of political
reforms, workers’ rights, or even regime change, potential users can utilize existing applica-
tions and social networks with very little overhead. These communications would not only
be protected from censorship but also from surveillance as they appear innocuous, holding
a key advantage over encryption. Since those most interested in this technology are likely to
already be under strict government surveillance, the last point is of even greater importance.
In regard to benefiting the U.S. government, the recently declassified U.S. Strategic
Framework for the Indo-Pacific includes the objective of enhancing U.S. engagement in
the Indo-Pacific region while educating local populations about the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP)’s “coercive behavior and influence operations” [8]. As a means to accomplish
this objective, the document contains the following specific action: “invest in capabilities
[redacted] that promote uncensored communication between Chinese people” [8]. Our re-
search involves building a steganographic model for use with existing Chinese messaging
platforms and thus directly supports the guiding strategy for the executive branch and the
National Security Strategy. If our research is successfully implemented, it will serve as a
secure means for citizens around the world to communicate with individuals within China,
or in other countries with repressive regimes, without arousing suspicion. Although the
U.S. government undoubtedly already has the means to communicate with those inside
China and is making investments elsewhere, this research would be yet another channel,
potentially enhancing operational resiliency. Operational command and control and/or sup-
port for elements operating inside China is much safer if accomplished remotely. Adaptive
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steganography might be yet another tool when encrypted communications are not available
but secrecy is required. Additionally, the potential impact of this model is greater than just
affecting citizens living under repressive regimes. The model presented here is something
of a steganographic “band-aid” that can be placed on existing messaging applications and
provide a secure covert channel. Other than the download of the overlay/plugin, the use of
this model is meant to undetectable by design, which will we later test and evaluate.
Of course, some critics would be quick to point out that this kind of technology has potential
to be abused. Recent reporting has shown that many of those who participated in the riots
that occurred at the Capitol building on January 6, 2021, coordinated their actions via the
messaging application Parler [9]. Due to the poor implementation of the application, user
data collected by the application was easily obtained and turned over to authorities [10].
These events serve as a cautionary tale to would-be pro-privacy application developers and
has two main lessons. First, tools designed for evading censorship and surveillance can be
used for nefarious purposes. Although the term “nefarious” can mean different things to
different people, in this case, the platform was allegedly used for spreading anti-democratic
sentiment and ultimately appears to have been used to coordinate an insurrection against
the United States government [11]. Therefore, this kind of technology can be thought of
as a double-edged sword that can accomplish the very opposite of what was intended.
For example, historically, the United States has consistently championed the principle of
democracy in an unqualified fashion.However, theMuslimBrotherhood in Egypt is arguably
not a political force that the U.S. government would prefer to be in power: a true commitment
to ideology requires a compromise in terms of pragmatism.
The other major lesson to be gleaned from Parler’s role in the Capitol building violence
was the fact that private user information was not protected by the application designers
and then leaked to authorities by third parties. Although it would be difficult to imagine this
as anything but a good thing, meaning that those involved in illegal behavior will be held
accountable for their actions, imagine a similar situation except occurring in China. Imagine
instead that pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong were using a similar application that
championed anti-censorship values. Then also imagine user data was hacked and leaked
to Chinese authorities leading to hundreds of arrests and disappearances. The key point
here is that poor technological implementation can actually make an “anti-censorship” app
into a sort of honeypot, only attracting the sorts of individuals that the CCP would be
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most concerned about. One could imagine a scenario in which the CCP designs a so-called
pro-privacy, anti-censorship app with the ultimate goal being to root out any potential
troublemakers in the population. There is Chinese historical precedent for such behavior,
such as Mao Zedong’s Hundred Flowers Campaign in which Mao Zedong invited criticism
from non-party affiliated intellectuals only later to retaliate against those same individuals,
sending many to labor camps and prison [12]. Therefore, serious attention should be paid
to how anti-censorship software will be implemented and disseminated as many Chinese
will likely be wary of potential backlash from the CCP.
However, it is important not to fall into the logical fallacy of assuming that just because
someone is using encryption, steganography, or other privacy or anti-censorship enabling
technology that they are in fact guilty of some kind of wrongdoing. For example, the
widespread use of encryption has been hotly debated, both in the U.S. and internationally,
the last several years due to the fear that criminals and terrorists will utilize the same tools
and techniques to protect their privacy and enable illegal behavior. In the case of China, the
government’s answer to the question of whether or not to allow privacy-enabling encryption
was to ban any software that the government cannot directly monitor. The answer to whether
the U.S. and others should allow encryption and steganography to be freely used follows
directly from whether citizens, society, and a nation believe that all individuals have the
right to privacy and free speech. In the case of China, the government does not believe
an individual’s right to privacy or free speech ever outweighs the good of the collective
group or the potential risk to state security [13]. In this context, the good of the collective
group specifically refers to the CCP’s interpretation of what is best for all Chinese citizens.
As for the United States, per the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2021 Interim
National Security Strategy, it is in our country’s best interest to spread and promote liberal,
democratic values and champion free speech [14]. There may be no better way to do that
than to create and export a platform where it can be accomplished at low risk and easily
accessed by average citizens.
1.4 Contributions
This research makes the following specific contributions to creating a capability that enables
and promotes the uncensored communication between people:
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• Demonstrates a technique to ratchet a ML-generated steganography algorithm.
• Tests and evaluates the efficacy of increasing steganographic embedding capacity
through a tiling process.
• Develops and evaluates a holistic framework and communications protocol for cir-
cumventing censorship utilizing steganography and cryptography.
• Evaluates a modified steganographic algorithm against steganalysis techniques.
• Designs and evaluates an effective statistical steganalytic attack to identify ML
steganography images based on distribution of decoding bit-errors.
• Identifies key shortcomings and challenges to design such a communication model.
1.5 Thesis Structure
In the following chapter, wewill provide an overview of key topics and terms such as privacy,
censorship, and steganography in addition to a summary of the history and current status of
Chinese digital surveillance and censorship. InChapter 3,wewill discuss the threatmodelwe
use to inform our overall steganographic model’s requirements.We then specify our model’s
requirements and explain how we selected an existing model to modify in accordance with
our needs. In Chapter 4, we explore the results of numerous experiments designed to
evaluate our model’s ability to to satisfy our requirements for an overall steganographic
messaging solution. Finally, in Chapter 5 we examine key conclusions drawn from results
of the experiments discussed in Chapter 4 in addition to key challenges and potential
vulnerabilities to fully developing and implementing our steganographic model.
7




In this chapter, we discuss key concepts and backgroundmaterial that provide context for our
research. We first explore the relationship between privacy and censorship and its relevance
to digital communications policy and technology. As steganography and cryptography
are common tools used to subvert censorship, we provide a basic overview of important
concepts related to steganography, steganalysis, and cryptography. We then discuss some
specific digital steganography and steganalysis techniques. Finally, we explore the history
and status quo of Chinese digital surveillance and censorship before we introduce the main
goal of our research: to develop an adaptive, ML steganographic solution to effectively
subvert censorship.
2.1 Privacy vs. Censorship
Before we discuss the general issue of censorship, it is important to define two key terms and
explain their relationship. Censorship is removing content deemed harmful to a population.
A key question is then who decides what is deemed harmful? The main debate surrounding
censorship typically revolves around who decides what is harmful. Many countries and
populations have different answers to this question, thus producing the variety of censorship
regimes present in the world today. Censorship enforcement includes removing selections
from media, such as parts of books, movies, or letters, or banning the sharing, selling,
or distribution of certain material outright. Claimed goals of censorship are often noble.
Governments that regularly engage in censorship often claim that they are doing so for
the benefit of their people. Some argue that governments censor material that they deem
threatening to themselves.
Althoughmany in theUnited States support freedomof expression, which inmanyways runs
counter to the principle of censorship, censorship remains commonplace. There are many
historical examples of censorship of American films, books, and artwork [15]. However,
censorship, regardless of the justification, is in conflict with the veryAmerican notion of free
speech. American laws regarding censorship are vague and poorly defined. For example,
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readers may be familiar with the phrase “I know it when I see it,” which is a reference to
Justice Potter Stewart’s attempt to define “hard-core pornography” during the 1964 Supreme
Court case Jacobellis v. Ohio [16]. In summary, freedom of expression and censorship exist
on a spectrum with one extreme being complete and utter freedom of expression and the
other, with the government completely controlling the speech and even thoughts of citizens
by only allowing them to express themselves in government-sanctioned ways.
Although this research aims to develop a generalized technical solution to enable citizens
living in countries whose governments’ policies tend toward the latter description, it is
first important to understand how such an extreme level of control is possible. In order
to build and maintain a robust censorship capability, a government must first be able to
access, exploit, and potentially deny any communication channel it wishes to censor. In
other words, censorship, especially at an individual level, can only exist if it is buttressed
by a massive surveillance infrastructure. For citizens living under such restrictions, it is
difficult to imagine individuals maintain any level of privacy. For our purposes, we will
define privacy as freedom from observation, either by the government, corporations, or
other citizens. The “surveillance state” is inherently at odds with the principle of privacy.
Therefore, in order to practice censorship, some level of privacy needs to be violated. This
relationship can also work in reverse: if one can gain true privacy, he or she cannot be
censored because, by definition, the censors will not be able to observe the communication
taking place.
Consider the common example ofAlice andBob as two parties communicating. Government
spies fill the role of Eve, who is passively intercepting Alice and Bob’s communications.
As Bob and Alice exchange messages back and forth, Bob sends a message considered
by the government to be “sensitive” or “harmful.” As soon as Eve detects the potentially
“harmful” message, she then goes beyond eavesdropping and plays the role of an active
attacker, who deletes the content and/or blocks the communications channel entirely. Our
research explores the possibility of creating content that, although it can be easily observed
by Eve or Mallory, it will never appear harmful and thus never be censored. This can be
accomplished by creating a message within a message that can only be observed if one
knows exactly where to look, also known as steganography.
Steganography is simply hiding a secret message within a “cover” message such that an
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outside observer, even if they see the cover message, does not perceive an embedded secret
message. The history of steganography goes back to the time of Ancient Greece, with the
term itself translating to “covered writing” [17]. In modern times, it was used in both the
WorldWars to pass secret messages written in disappearing ink [17]. Messages written with
disappearing or invisible ink would only become visible when a certain chemical was later
applied to the dried ink [17]. Another modern example of steganography is the microdot. A
microdot is a miniaturized version of a text or image, sometimes so small that they resemble
a dot, hence the name. These kinds of technologies were used by spies as far back as the
Franco-Prussian war, during bothWorldWars and likely up through today [17]. These forms
of steganography rely upon technical solutions to obscure a hidden message, but once the
means of the hiding is discovered, the secret message can easily be seen as it is not encoded
in any meaningful way.
A related form of steganography that can complicate the decoding process is linguistic
steganography that uses codes or codewords to symbolize a second meaning. Anyone who
has watched the first season of the popular HBO Show The Wire has seen an example
of this kind of steganography. Without providing too many spoilers, the plot revolves
around a police strategy to impede the activities of Baltimore drug dealers, primarily
through intercepting communications [18]. The drug dealers quickly learn to avoid certain
communications methods and invent codes of their own. At first, they adapt by obscuring
phone numbers sent to pagers by flipping the original number across the axes of a phone
keypad, or in the words of the characters, “jumping the 5” [18]. For example, if they wanted
to send the number 1234, they would send 9876. In later seasons, the steganographic
system transformed into image texting where exchanged images were of a clock face with
the clock hands corresponding to specific locations in the Baltimore area. Eventually the
police caught onto both steganographic methods, which, as we will discuss later in the
paper, is indicative of the generally weak security guarantees provided by steganography.
Although the techniques discussed above utilize digital communications infrastructure, the
underlying mechanism simply maps clock hands to numbers corresponding to locations.
Digital steganography involves actually modifying bit values of the data being sent. These
techniques create the possibility for embedding much more data than analog techniques
and making discovery of the steganography much more difficult (see Section 2.1.3 for more
details).
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2.1.1 Steganography vs. Cryptography
Generally, steganography is hiding data within other data. The cover, which is the data
within which a message is hidden, can be in the form of text, an image, or any kind of
digital file. The goal of steganography is to hide a secret message within a cover to hide the
fact that such a message even exists. A more technical way of describing steganography is
that it makes use of covert channels within a given medium to secretly relay data. In digital
image steganography, the bits in a given cover image must be modified in such a way that
any changes are both visually imperceptible and difficult to detect by any other means.
Steganalysis is the process of detecting the underlying encoded stego-messages, or the output
messages produced by steganography. In general, steganography does not have the same
types of provable security guarantees, such as Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity,
that commonly used cryptographic algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) do, which we will explain below. However, the main appeal of steganography over
cryptography is its covert nature. In otherwords, effective steganography is clandestinewhile
effective cryptography is not required to be. Encrypted data, otherwise known as ciphertext,
is typically easily distinguishable from unencrypted data, or plaintext. For example, the
visual representation of an encrypted image is similar to white noise and displays high
entropy. Likewise, an encrypted text file contains random-looking (and should be quite
close to random) bytes. In other words, encrypted files are not understandable and are
clearly different from non-encrypted files. On the other hand, a stego-image, which is a
cover image embedded with a secret message, appears as a normal image with no obvious
distortions or artifacts.
Although the main focus of this thesis is steganography, the scope of research includes
cryptography and several related principles, such as key generation and ratcheting algo-
rithms. The most fundamental principles on the use of cryptography were developed by Dr.
August Kerckhoff and published in 1883 [19]. He laid out six total principles for a secure
telegraphic system. Today, Kerckhoff’s Principle is most closely associated with just one of
his six principles: the system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy with-
out causing trouble. Although nearly all modern cryptographic applications adhere to this
principle, steganography does not have the same security guarantees. In fact, steganography
relies on “security through obscurity,” which is clearly at odds with Kerckhoff’s Principle.
For example, one reason for AES being considered secure is that, statistically, there are
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so many possible solutions for the shared private key that it is computationally infeasible
to try all keys. As for the algorithm itself, it is an open standard and was created with
significant input from the global cryptographic community [20]. Over the past twenty years,
many researchers have attempted various attacks against the algorithm which have not been
successful [21]. Given that the algorithm standard is open, as long as the key is protected,
the secrecy of the system itself is unimportant. Conversely, most pure steganography algo-
rithms, those not incorporating some form of cryptography, are compromised as soon as
the algorithm is guessed or identified.
In the case of AES, just because an attacker knows that a message was encrypted using AES
does not mean they will be able to decrypt the message. Assuming the algorithm is secure
and has no known attacks, which the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
suggests is the case [21], the attacker needs to know both that AES was used and the shared
key. If one’s main goal is to prevent others from reading a secret message, then cryptography
is the best solution. However, if the goal is to both hide the fact that a secret message is
sent and protect the contents of that message, then both steganography and cryptography
can be used together. A simple implementation is described below: first, a message is
encrypted, then encoded into a cover image or document, sent over some communications
channel, and then the message will decoded from the stego image and then decrypted. This
process requires both sender and receive to use the same steganographic and cryptographic
algorithms and keys. We assume a similar premise of use for this work.
What makes steganography particularly vulnerable is that, in many cases, the system itself
is the secret. For example, if Alice and Bob are using microdots to hide their messages, a
would-be attacker need only know that they are usingmicrodots and they can easily acquire a
magnifying glass and decode themessages. Amore robust implementation of steganography
would include the flexibility of cryptography-like keys which enable each pair of users to
have a unique key which prevents unauthorized viewing by other parties. In the case of ML-
generated steganographic models, the weights of the models might be thought of as a sort
of key. In order to encode and decode a given cover image and stego-image respectively,
both sender and recipient will need to use the same model, or in other words, the same
neural network structure with the same weight values. The uniqueness created by these
different weights makes the attacker’s job more difficult by requiring that they know not just
the general model used, but also the specific weights, which depending on the size of the
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“key space” or total possible values of weights that result in a usable model, could introduce
significant computational overhead (see Section 5.2.5 for further discussion of exploring the
key space of our model). However possible collisions and viable distance required between
weights for usable models must be assessed to determine the “key space.” Our research
explores the possibility of using neural net weights as steganographic “keys” to strengthen
the minimal security guarantees associated with most applications of steganography. Note
also that by this type of interpretation of “keys,” where the network itself may be known
without compromising security, we can align the steganographic technique to Kerckhoff’s
Principle. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the limitations of steganographic security and
assume the steganographic implementation is used in tandem with cryptography. From
this point on, discussion of steganography will be focused on ML-based steganography
techniques.
2.1.2 Steganalysis Basics
The simplest definition of steganalysis is the process of identifying the use of steganography
[22]. However, steganalysis can also refer to process of discovering the original secret
message. Identifying the use of steganography can be accomplished with a binary classifier
or assigning a given image a probability value of containing steganography. On the other
hand, message recovery is much more difficult. Just because a given steganalysis technique
can accurately determine whether an image is a stego-image, which is an image that contains
a secret message embedded by some steganographic algorithm, it does not mean that
technique will be able to recover the original secret message [22]. For example, one can
employ a passive steganalysis method of processing an image by flipping every Least
Significant Bit (LSB) per pixel in an image to destroy any potential LSB-encoded secret
message without significantly altering the perceptual quality of the image [23]. Although
the secret message will have been destroyed, it will not recovered by the attacker or the
intended recipient.
A stego-image’s ability to withstand image processing and compression techniques without
corrupting the message can be referred to as a steganographic technique’s robustness. In
other words, robustness is a measure of a given steganographic algorithm’s resistance
to image processing and compression techniques [23]. A less robust technique decreases
the chances that an embedded secret message will reach its intended recipient, however,
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it also reduces the adversary’s chance of exploiting the secret message. Depending on
the implementation, robustness may or may not be a desirable quality. In watermarking,
robustness is a key requirement as a watermark functions as a permanent label or signature
that should be “undeletable.” In steganography, where covert communication is the goal,
it may be desirable to choose a non-robust technique that “erases” an embedded message
upon any image processing or compression. In this way, an extremely fragile (non-robust)
steganographic technique could be used to perform fuzzing of image processing techniques.
The recipient could analyze the received image and determine the level of image processing
that had been performed on that image and thus tailor a steganographic solution to avoid
techniques that are vulnerable to the identified methods of image processing used.
2.1.3 Digital Steganography and Steganalysis Techniques
There are many different digital steganography and steganalysis techniques. The simplest
kind of digital steganography takes advantage of file formats. A file contains an End Of
File (EOF) tag, which marks the end of the file. However, one can still write data beyond this
marker. When a JPEG file which has information added beyond the EOF tag is viewed in a
photo viewing application, there is nothing different about the image to suggest that extra
information has been added precisely because that information is not present in the displayed
image [23]. However, if one were to examine the file in raw hexadecimal notation, the added
information would be clearly visible. Techniques such as this are quite easy to detect and
have virtually no security guarantees. Many other types of digital image steganography exist
in the spatial domain involving the modifications of pixel values in a given cover image [23].
Any successful steganographic method must be resistant to common basic steganalysis
techniques. Techniques include visual steganalysis, structural steganalysis, statistical ste-
ganalysis, and learning steganalysis [22]. If sent images are being manually monitored for
sensitive content, then the steganography must not be visually apparent; in other words,
it must be immune to the most rudimentary form of visual steganalysis. Visual steganal-
ysis can also involve examining transformations [22] of an image to look for any visual
anomalies. Structural steganalysis requires examination of the file format or structure of a
file for any signs of modification [22]. Statistical steganalysis typically involves making a
judgment whether an image is a stego-image based on if certain parameters of the image
fall within a theoretical probability distribution of a stego-image generated by a certain
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stego-system [22]. Learning steganalysis is nothing more than a steganalysis technique that
draws on those previously listed but enabled by machine learning. It is likely that emerging
and future censorship techniques will take advantage of technological achievements in both
ML and Artificial Intelligence (AI) to detect censored images and the use of steganography
to hide content.
LSB is a common technique that involves replacing the LSB pixels in an image with
the binary corresponding to a secret message. The recipient of an LSB-encoded image
need only to read the LSB of each pixel to find the hidden message. Although more
advanced than just adding extra information in an unexpected location within a certain file
format, this kind of steganography is vulnerable to statistical steganalysis techniques such
as the Chi-squared and sample pairs analysis (SPA) attacks. Chi-squared, Regular-Singular
(RS), Weighted-Steganalysis (WS), Sample Pairs Analysis (SPA) and Difference Image
Histogram (DIH) are common statistical analysis techniques [24]. These techniques are
also known as structural attacks that look for irregularities in the spatial domain of images.
Other state-of-the-art spatial domain steganography algorithms includeHighlyUndetectable
Steganography (HUGO),WaveletObtainedWeights (WOW) andUniversalWavelet Relative
Distortion (UNIWARD) [25]. These techniques all differ in the precise way in which they
minimize their own distortion metric, which implies they will be vulnerable/resistant to
different types of steganalysis [25].
In addition to steganography algorithms that operate in the spatial domain, there are those
that modify the frequency domain. These algorithms apply a mathematical transformation,
such as Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), and Discrete
Transform (DFT), to the cover image resulting in changes to a number of coefficients that
correspond to a block of pixels [23]. These coefficients can be carefully modified to embed
a secret message without causing any noticeable alteration to the original image. Although
algorithms implemented in the frequency domain may be slightly more complicated than
those in the spatial domain, they are susceptible to the same kind of statistical attacks.
In order to resist steganalysis, our model will be adaptive in exactly how a secret message
is embedded in an image file. The term “adaptive” refers specifically to the weight values
in the neural net of our model. These weight values are the “key” to how bits are embedded
and thus knowing the exact weight values is essential for decoding the message from a
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stego-image. An adaptive model will be less susceptible to targeted steganalysis techniques
developed to detect usage of known stego-systems [22]. Research has shown that certain
steganographic techniques, such as LSB where a secret message is embedded in the least
significant bits of an image’s pixels, can be reliably detectedwith statistical steganalysis [25].
Additionally, other well-known steganographic techniques such as HUGO, WOW and S-
Uniward can be more easily detected than some machine learning generated models such
as HiDDeN [25]. By using a novel algorithm or a modified, adaptive version of an existing
algorithmwe can increase a potential adversary’s computational overhead by requiring them
to run multiple different targeted steganalyzers [22]. However, a model which guarantees
long-term security must also be immune to future steganalytic attacks. Recent research has
identified the potential for using adversarial training to develop both steganographic models
and steganalyzers that compete with existing models in terms of visual perceptibility and
steganography detection [26]. It is likely that machine learning will be used to improve upon
existing steganographic systems and to develop better performing steganalysis. Artificial
Training Sets (ATS) is an example of a current state-of-the-art ML-based steganalyzer that
was developed from machine learning [27]. It relies upon training a steganalyzer on certain
algorithms and embedding rates. Thus, our model must not only provide protection against
current state-of-the-art ML-based steganalysis techniques such as ATS, but also against
algorithms produced by unsupervised learning [26].
2.2 Chinese Digital Surveillance and Censorship
Over twenty years ago, then President Clinton proclaimed that China’s attempts to “crack
down on the internet” were like “nailing jello to a wall” [28]. However, those efforts seem
to have largely succeeded. Not only has the Chinese government succeeded in filtering
its internet but it did so without radically upsetting its populace while simultaneously
experiencing a major economic and technological boom. Although most Chinese are aware
of the invasive nature of their government’s surveillance apparatus, they hold complex
attitudes toward censorship. Many Chinese are indifferent or even generally supportive of
censorship as they believe it prevents the spread of misinformation [3]. What many in
the West would see as a gross overreach of government power and a clear violation of
free speech, many Chinese see as a necessary evil that protects people from themselves.
However complex Chinese attitudes towards censorship may be, there exist certain elements
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of the population who wish to share sensitive information covertly. Protests in China are
becoming more common in recent years and there have been consistent, usually localized
movements in support of issues such as worker’s rights [29], the environment [29] and
anti-corruption [29].
Although subverting censorship may not be of interest to the average Chinese citizen who is
just trying to keep their head down in their quest for the “Chinese dream,” labor organizers,
protest leaders, ethnic minorities, and NGOs, or anyone else seeking to share sensitive
information require a suitable platform. It is important to note that these concerns are
not only harbored by militant, anti-government dissidents, but by some ordinary citizens
who are concerned with being flagged by authorities. For example, how does one ask a
family member in China how the COVID-19 situation is locally? The reason behind the
question is concern for one’s family; however, the answer may well be considered sensitive
by the Chinese government. Leaked documents from the Cyberspace Administration of
China demonstrated how the government heavily censored sensitive COVID-19-related
events, such as the death of Dr. Li Wenliang, over many media platforms [30]. Anti-
censorship mechanisms can enable family members to communicate with each other across
vast distances, regardless of the “sensitivity” of the topics. Unfortunately, in China, there are
very few messaging applications allowed for download and/or use within the country and
even fewer that have any reasonable security guarantees.1 As a result, Chinese government
surveillance of messaging applications is simplified because nearly all messaging traffic is
on a few select, government-approved platforms. Most users are relegated to using Chinese-
developed software which is routinely monitored and censored by the government [31].
Although digital censorship across Chinese communications platforms is both ubiquitous
and continuous, current detection techniques of targeted content are largely rule-based [32].
Billions of people, both in China and beyond, utilize Chinese-developed messaging ap-
plications: WeChat itself has over a billion global users [32]. All messaging applications
available for download in China, to some degree, practice censorship, and by extension
surveillance, as required by Chinese law [32]. Research has identified Chinese-developed
messaging applications mainly utilize censorship models centered around flexible keyword
and image block-lists to both preemptively block and retroactively remove sensitive con-
1At the time of the writing of this paper, the messaging application Signal is still usable in mainland China;
however, it is not available for download from the Apple or Android digital stores.
18
tent [32]. In many of these models, posts and images can be automatically flagged and then
later manually reviewed [32]. Even if users were somehow able to use a VPN, which some
tech-savvy Chinese netizens do, the use of encryption could be easily identified and may
cause flagging of certain users for increased surveillance and monitoring [3]. To summarize,
there are virtually no secure messaging applications available for use in China. Additionally,
switching to a new messaging app requires others to switch to the same app to gain any
security benefits.
Researchers have discovered that WeChat uses a combination of automated Optical Char-
acter Recognition (OCR) and statistical techniques to identify and censor sensitive images
in near real-time [32]. Perhaps the most widely known example of an image commonly
censored by Chinese authorities, and considered by some to be one of the most recognized
photographs of the 20th century, is the 1989 photograph of “Tank Man” in Tiananmen
square [33]. It consists of a man in a briefcase standing in the path of three tanks in Tianan-
men square in Beĳing and is considered symbolic of the protests and modern-day resistance
to authoritarianism [33]. In order to evaluate whether an image is considered sensitive by
WeChat, it goes through a number of checks. The first check of an image is performed
client-side as the image in question is compared against a hash index of MD5 hashes of
known, blacklisted images [32]. As such, flipping the orientation of a known, censored im-
age upside down is not enough to circumvent censorship. The second check occurs after the
image has been sent and is checked via OCR, statistical, and manual visual techniques for
sensitive content. This two-stage filtering process utilizes the hash check to minimize com-
putationally expensive OCR and statistical checks when the image in question has already
been identified. However, the second stage does not occur instantly and blocked images
can remain visible for some time. Any image whose hash does not exist in the blacklist
index and does not appear to contain sensitive content will not be blocked. Therefore, if the
researcher’s main conclusions are correct, even simple steganography will not be detected.
Even if there is no immediate detection, there still exists the risk of after-the-fact detection
which could result in consequences ranging from deleting the original content, to banning
accounts, and even potential legal consequences. Therefore, simple steganography tech-
niques are not adequate anti-censorship tools because they merely reduce the likelihood
of short-term censorship and depending on the message content, potentially increase the
long-term risk to all parties involved by providing a history of exchanged messages through
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which censors can sort, should the steganography later be discovered. Additionally, although
current filtering techniques are somewhat rudimentary, these techniques will only improve
over time as they take advantage of technological improvements in ML and AI. However,
although Chinese authorities have an expansive workforce enforcing censorship, the sheer
number of exchanged images precludes manual analysis of every image shared across all
messaging applications. As a result, a significant portion of current image censorship is
automated. Although this kind of image filtering generally requires massive amounts of
resources, the Chinese government has demonstrated its incredible ability to nail jello to
the wall time and again. In short, the Chinese government will only improve its messaging
censorship capabilities and currently available anti-censorship techniques will become less
effective over time.
We therefore propose an adaptive, image-based steganographic model for use with popular
messaging applications that avoids automatic censorship mechanisms, provides crypto-
graphic protections, and is visibly imperceptible. Such a model would enable users to com-
municate sensitive information clandestinely and with strong security guarantees, which is
a capability that is otherwise non-existent in mainland China.
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CHAPTER 3:
Threat Model and Model Requirements
This chapter introduces the threat model for censorship in messaging applications and
the requirements for operation of a successful censorship subversion model. First, we
discuss the basic motives, capabilities, and constraints of the threat actor. Next, we discuss
countermeasures to overcome the threat actor’s censorship capabilities in the form of our
model requirements.
3.1 Threat Model
The threat model that our overall communication framework was created around is based on
the Chinese censorship system. More generally, we assume the threat to be a well-financed,
technologically advanced, and highly motivated and capable nation-state. Therefore, in the
development of our framework, we assume that the adversary has the means and capability
to passively access all local and cloud-based information for any user. Additionally, the
adversary can be assumed to have full control of the network (e.g., the adversary has
ability to replay, delete, delay, or inject messages). It also has ability to control devices
on the network, but not the device endpoints (i.e., controlling device C should not affect
the adversary’s ability to read A’s and B’s messages to each other). We acknowledge it
is possible that many authoritarian governments may have the capability to selectively
access and control a target end user device at a small-scale, but as our model is aimed at
circumventing mass censorship, these techniques are not within our threat model and fall
outside the scope of this thesis. Many other governments around the world utilize similar
technology-based censorship methods and China, although it is arguable the most proficient
is merely a case example.
Not only dowe assume that the adversary is capable of intercepting andmanipulating internet
protocol and message traffic, but that they are also capable of filtering and analyzing the
data. Althoughwe discussed some low-techmethods currently employed by censorsworking
for WeChat, we assume the adversary has a much greater potential capability to identify
any sort of content deemed malicious, which could include anti-government messaging,
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pornography, encryption, or steganography. Content deemed malicious extends beyond the
aforementioned categories to content that “spreads rumors or disturbs social order,” “insults
or defames third parties,” or “jeopardizes the nation’s unity” [34]. We assume that such
passive identification and active filtering of network traffic can be accomplished if a given
user is already flagged or targeted. Additionally, it is assumed that real user identification
is required to register accounts, as is the case for most platforms in China [34]. If advanced
capabilities are not used, we assume that the adversary will develop these capabilities




Although this requirement seems straightforward, proving visual imperceptibility is trouble-
some. Research has shown that commonly used metrics for measuring visual perceptibility
such as Euclidean distance, Pseudorandom Noise Ratio (PSNR) and Structural Similarity
Index Measure (SSIM) are not always good approximations for what is detectable by hu-
man vision [35]. Proving humans cannot visually discern differences between two images
is impossible without a concrete standard, which does not appear to exist. For our purposes,
visual imperceptibility means a human observer would not be able to detect any obvious
signs of image manipulation. This definition is purposefully vague as it provides us some
flexibility to determine what is visually imperceptible. Given the variety of the kinds of
images people share, there is significant room for the use of filters, image processing or other
photo editing techniques. However, the manipulation must not be easily identifiable as some
kind of inadvertent remnant of steganographic manipulation, such as strange coloration or
pixelation in parts of the image. Additionally, even non-altered images can appear to have
some kind of odd mark as a result of lighting or particulates in the air. Visual perceptibility
can be assessed through surveys of test subjects. This introduces other potential issues such
as human error and how best to frame the test to minimize the possibility of test subjects
imagining differences where none exist. Such assessments are left to future work, and we
will aim to address visual imperceptibility only as far as very noticeable changes in a cover-
image and instead focus on other forms of steganalysis. Although this method is somewhat
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unscientific, the underlying goal is to “hide within the noise” of other shared images. We
will include stego-images in the paper and let readers themselves evaluate whether or not
the steganography is visually imperceptible.
3.2.2 Resistant to Steganalysis
Our model must be resistant to basic statistical steganalysis techniques as well as more
advanced ML-enabled techniques. Images generated by our model will have to stand-up
to the best known steganalysis techniques with the goal of correct classification being
“50 percent”: any deviation from 50 percent implies the model can detect steganography
with better than random chance. Our model is primarily concerned with overcoming blind
steganalysiswhich is steganalysis that is not targeted at detecting the use of any one particular
steganographic technique [22]. However, we will also attempt to create a model resistant to
targeted steganalysis. If a particular type of steganography becomes popular enough, nation
states will eventually recognize this and tailor steganalysis to counter the most commonly
used algorithms.
3.2.3 Long-Term Security
The simplest way to guarantee the long-term security of a message is to use provably secure
encryption. Before embedding the user’s designated secret message into a cover-image,
the message will be encrypted, such as the Signal protocol. The cryptographic Signal
protocol has security guarantees beyond most messaging platforms, particularly forward
secrecy [36]. This is accomplished by a ratcheting mechanism in which a new encryption
key is generated from several inputs supplied by each user. The term “ratchet” is used
because, like the tool, it can only operate in one direction, creating a new key that is totally
incompatible with previously generated keys. Our research involves answering the question
of whether a machine-learning based steganographic model can be ratcheted in a similar
way.
3.2.4 Unique Solutions Per Pair of Users
This requirement incorporates steganalysis resistance and long-term security. In current
uses of steganography, such as LSB, the ability to decode the encoded message requires
only that the recipient know the algorithm that was used. In LSB steganography, the least
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significant bit of each pixel is read and those values are put together to reconstruct the
encoded message. The steganographic “key” is the algorithm itself.
However, in machine-learning generated steganography, the “key” comes in the form of
the structure of the model and its particular weights. In order to decode ML-generated
steganography, one must know the general algorithm (the structure of the neural network)
and the weights associated with the layers of the network(s).We require our model be able to
generate a unique steganographic solution per pair of users in a way that does not negatively
affect usability. Specifically, we wish to avoid collisions between models used by different
pairs of users. A collision can be defined as a degree of similarity between solutions such
that they are no longer considered unique. We define this in terms of decoding bit-error,
where observed decoding bit-error values below .4 will be considered collisions.
By using model weights as keys, we are incorporating an extra layer of security on top of
just the use of steganography. If we put all the layers of security for our steganographic
system together we have our steganographic algorithm, its unique weights, and encrypted
message (before steganographic encoding). In order for an attacker to read our original
secret message, first they would have to recognize that steganography was used, which
breaks our required security assumption for the ML-based steganographic model. However,
even though the model is technically broken at this point, the attacker cannot yet read the
original message and there is hope of protecting the long-term security of the message.
They would need to identify the particular algorithm used and if it was a ML-generated
algorithm, they would also need the specific weights for all neural networks. Finally, if they
were able to obtain that information, they would need to utilize some form of cryptanalysis
to obtain the encrypted message. By using a combination of unique steganography and
provably secure cryptography, we increase the cost to the attacker.
3.2.5 Usability
Usability is the collective measurement of several other elements including capacity, reli-
ability, bandwidth, processing power, and user interface. In terms of capacity, the model
must be able to embed a message of a “reasonable” length. Given the maximum size of a
twitter “tweet” is 280 characters, we will require a required capacity of 280 characters as a
heuristic for user expectations of capacity. Average Short Message Service (SMS) lengths
24
vary between languages and age groups. If Unicode Transformation Format - 8 Bit (UTF-8)
encoding is used, UNICODE encoded characters take up from two to four bytes each, which
still allows a minimum of 70 Chinese characters, likely more, which is much longer than
the average Chinese sentence, far exceeding our requirements [37]. Research from 2014 on
machine translation has shown that the average sentence length in Chinese microblogs is
about 25 characters [37]. Therefore, our model could theoretically embed at least two and
up to five average microblog posts, which is more than enough space to convey a concise
message.
As a sub-component of usability, a certain degree of reliability as a feature is assumed
in most modern technical applications. However, reliability in our case depends upon the
accuracy of the decoder to decode the embedded message in a stego-image. Because we
are considering ML-generated models, loss metrics will improve gradually as training is
performed. In many cases, obtaining a loss of zero is impossible, which means that there
will be some small level of loss or inaccuracy with models generated using ML. Therefore,
we require a maximum limit of .05 bit-error in message decoding. In other words, our
model must be able to decode a given embedded message from a cover image with at
least 95 percent accuracy. Researchers have shown that using error correcting codes with
ML generated steganographic models can reduce small decoding bit-errors to zero [25].
Therefore, we assume that error-correcting codes are used in tandem with the maximum
.05 bit-error requirement.
Bandwidth and processing power are also both important considerations. In order to gen-
erally bound the problem, we require that bandwidth and processing power requirements
be commensurate with other popular, currently deployed mobile applications. This level
of bandwidth is sufficient because our model should not require any extra bandwidth, as
encoded messages are in the form of modified pixel values and do not increase the amount
of data transmitted. The only potential challenge to constraining processing power require-
ments to currently deployed mobile applications is the introduction of ML. However, as
stated above, as long as increases in power consumption do not significantly impact the
user’s experience, at least to the extent that they do not deter the user from using the
application, the processing power requirements are somewhat flexible.
Latency is another key sub-component of usability. Latency requirements for our model
25
are similar to popular messaging applications. The main requirement is that messages are
delivered and accessible in near-real time, on the order of seconds. We have a higher
tolerance for initial key exchange latency but in order for this model to be usable, it should
not significantly detract from the user experience (considerations for initial distribution are
discussed more in Section 5.2.6). By increasing the latency tolerance, we enable the ML
generation of a sufficiently unique steganographic solution, thereby increasing the difficulty
of steganalysis. In other words, ML takes time but can produce a unique solution, which
protects users from would-be attackers.
In regard to user interface and experience, it is unreasonable to expect to attract a high
number of users with a complex and difficult-to-use program. Therefore, this model utilizes
existing platforms to simplify the problem of initial adoption. However, users will still be
required to download a plugin-type application that uses a simple GUI. Many messaging
applications, especially Chinese-developed applications, provide limited developer support,
especially for developers interested in integrating features that may be at odds with the
original developer’s or the local government’s goals and priorities. Therefore, our model
will be flexible enough to be implemented with different platforms and this research will
focus more on the model itself than implementation details.
3.3 Model Selection
In order to meet the above requirements, we selected a pre-existing machine learning
steganographic model as a template. We selected the “HiDDeN” model produced by re-
searchers Jiren Zhu, Russell Kaplan, Justin Johnson and Li Fei-Fei of Stanford Univer-
sity [25]. In a 2018 paper entitled, “HiDDeN: Hiding Data With Deep Networks,” the
researchers showed how neural nets can be used to train both an encoder that is capable of
producing stego-images free from visually perceptible perturbations and a decoder that can
decode the hidden message from the stego-image with a high degree of accuracy [25]. There
were several implementations of the researchers’ code available on GitHub, but, ultimately,
we chose to use a PyTorch implementation created by “ando-khachatryan” due to Python
usability and the code being easily modifiable [38]. The included code allowed for a wide
range of experimentationwhich included a long list of command line arguments, some of the
most important being message length, number of training epochs, and batch size. Although
this model fits several of our requirements “out-of-box,” it is computationally demanding
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and training our models until convergence initially took nearly a week on high-end last
generation NVIDIA GPUs.
Using the “HiDDeN” model as a template, we make multiple, significant modifications to
the original code which allow us to perform a number of experiments which aim to evaluate
each of our requirements.
27




In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our chosen steganographic algorithm for implemen-
tationwithin a broader censorship subverting framework, we performed various experiments
listed in Table 4.1. Much of the experimentation involved modifying the implementation of
the HiDDeN algorithm to achieve our model’s goals outlined in the previous chapter. More
specifically, we sought to answer the following questions:
• Can a ML-generated steganographic algorithm be ratcheted in a way similar to cryp-
tographic ratcheting, and if so, what is the best mechanism?
– If so, this would enable a steganographic form of forward secrecy.
• Can the HiDDeN algorithm be used to satisfy our capacity, message length, and visual
imperceptibility requirements?
– If so, the HiDDeNmodel has potential to be incorporated into an anti-censorship
steganographic system.
• Do any modifications to the original implementation affect resistance to steganalysis?
– If so, this would limit the algorithm’s appeal and require further modification
and testing.
4.1 Feasibility of Training to Generate New Models
The following section describes experiments conducted to evaluate the model’s initial
suitability to meet the unique solution requirement specified in Section 3.2.4. Because the
terms “intra-model” and “inter-model” are used frequently throughout the chapter, they are
defined here. When we refer to the intra-model bit-error, we are referring to the observed
bit-error when using the encoder and decoder from the same epoch of the same model. If
the ML model is adequately trained and converges to a solution, this number should be
close to zero, indicating that the model can generate and decode its own messages with
high accuracy. When we refer to the inter-model bit-error, we are referring to the bit-error
observedwhen decoding stego-imageswith a decoder taken from onemodel, and an encoder
taken from another. If the models are truly “separate,” meaning that they utilized different
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Experiment Description Goal Results Significance
1. Feasibility of Additional Training to Generate New Models
1.1. Inter-epoch decodability Determine intra-model (single model)
encoding/decoding compatibility
between training epochs
Low bit-error = high compatibility Extra training is not a good approach
for ratcheting model
1.2. Inter-model decodability Determine encoding/decoding
compatibility between epochs between
two separately trained models
High bit-error = low compatibility Separately trained models converge to
unique solutions
2. Message Length and Capacity
2.1. Maximum message length testing Determine maximum feasible message
length
Any length past 64 bits takes too long to
train (multiple days +)
Other techniques to increase encoding
capacity are needed.
2.2. Image split into many small tiles
and tiles encoded individually
Determine feasibility of tiling Visually perceptible but very subtly Tiling approach could be effective
solution for increasing model encoding
capacity
2.3. Calculate differences between
cover and stego-image (sub-experiment
of tiling feasibility)
Determine how model is modifying
pixel values and color channels
Greatest changes to color channels
appear where that color is least present,
changes are nearly binary in nature
Edge smoothing techniques may be
effective in decreasing visual
perceptibility without corrupting
encoded message.
3. New Model Generation by Modifying Model Weights
3.1. Add random noise to
encoder/decoder final layers to create
new model
Determine effectiveness of adding
random noise to select neural net layers
to ratchet model.
Somewhat effective, approach breaks
down after multiple ratchets, introduces
too much loss. Star-generation model
approach is fairly effective
Limits of this approach are worth
investigating.
3.2. Determine noise thresholds for
creating new model
Determine if noise-adding to select
layers approach is worth continued
experimentation.
Could not find suitable threshold,
bit-error too high and training time too
long
Not feasible for ratcheting: slow
convergence, too many collisions.
3.3. Reinitialize layers to create new
model
Determine effectiveness of
re-initializing neural net layers to
ratchet model
Very effective (fast convergence, low
loss and bit-error)
Potentially feasible for ratcheting. Key
exchange / bootstrapping is still a
problem (how to send weights securely
over public channel). Production of
weights is restricted to one party.
4. Steganalysis Vulnerability
4.1. Encode/decode sample image 1000
times over three separate models,
determine distribution of errors
Determine distribution of errors over 30
bits
Errors are not uniformly distributed Variation of this technique could be
used in steganalysis (detection)
4.2. Encode constant, known plaintext
in 2000 sample images with model A,
decode with model B, determine
distribution of errors
Determine distribution of errors over 30
bits
Errors are not uniformly distributed This technique could be used in
steganalysis
4.3. Generate 2000 sample cover
images, decode with model B against
known plaintext, determine distribution
of errors
Determine distribution of errors over 30
bits
Errors are distributed much differently
than for decoding stego-images
Combined with experiment 4.2
technique to create feasible attack,
results in huge vulnerability for
HiDDeN and other ML steganography
4.4. Perform statistical steganalysis
attacks against HiDDeN, SGM, and
ratcheted models
Determine effectiveness of attacks Attacks not particularly good at
detecting steganography
Modified models still robust against
common, statistical steganalysis
techniques
Figure 4.1. Table of experiments and results
initialization seeds or they have been effectively ratcheted, the observed bit-error should be
very close to .5, mirroring the bit-error one would achieve with random guessing.
4.1.1 Inter-epoch Decodability
Following initial setup, our first experiment was designed to determine if it was possible
to take a pre-trained model and ratchet it forward in a way that generates a new, unique
solution that is not compatible with other models, including the pre-trained model it was
generated from. In order to determine if it is feasible to modify model weights to create new,
unique encoders and decoders that have no backward compatibility with previously trained
encoders and decoders, we first analyzed the ability of the HiDDeN model to encode and
decode stego-images produced by encoders and decoded by decoders taken from different
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training epochs for a single HiDDeN model. In other words, we assess if extra training
causes a model to converge to a new steganographic solution. Our test involved producing
a stego-image by encoding the test cover image with a randomly generated 30-bit string,
decoding the resulting stego-image with our selected decoder andmeasuring the bit-error by
rounding the decoded values and then comparing them to the original randomly generated
string [38]. For example, a cover image was encoded with the encoder from epoch 1,
producing a stego-image, then that stego-image was decoded with decoders taken from
every epoch tested, 1 through 300. We used the PyTorch implementation of HiDDeN’s
authors created by user “ando-khachatryan” on GitHub as a framework for our tests. Most
of our experiments are heavily modified versions of the “test_model.py” program [38]. This
program generates a random bit string, encodes it into a user-specified cover image, decodes
the message, and determines the bit-error.
For each encoder and decoder pair, this test was performed ten times and the final average
bit-error was calculated across all runs. A perfectly decoded message with no errors has
a bit-error of 0, the minimum, and at the other end of accuracy is a bit-error of .5, the
maximum, which is equivalent to random guessing. A bit-error of .5 is the maximum
because if one were to achieve a consistent bit-error of 1, where every bit is decoded as
the exact opposite of the corresponding bit in the original message, we could easily flip all
the bits in the decoded message to achieve a bit-error of 0. In other words, a bit-error of
.5 signifies high entropy and no discernible connection between input and output values.
Because a bit-error of .5 is synonymous with maximum entropy, for all figures describing
experiments in this paper, the maximum possible bit-error is .5. Specifically, for the reasons
described above, any actual bit-error values exceeding .5 were converted to the absolute
value of the difference between that value and .5.
The goal of this experiment was to determine if extra training could be used to ratchet a
model’s weights forward to create a new steganographic solution, preventing the decoding
of images generated by an “older” model when using the decoder from a “newer” model,
a subsequently trained epoch, and vice versa. The results were unsurprising in that they
confirmed that there is a high degree of encoding and decoding accuracy across training
epochs belonging to a singly trained model. This is unsurprising because during training,
each subsequent training epoch incrementally reduces loss and bit-error and thus converges
to the same local minimum or solution. In other words, additional training, especially for a
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model that has converged or nearly converged to a usable steganographic solution, is not a
viable solution to ratchet our model forward to generate a new, unique model.
Figure 4.2 shows encoder/decoder combination bit-error declining with additional model
training. Higher number epochs are those that have undergone more training and thus are
better able to decode stego-images produced in that epoch and in previous epochs. With the
exception of some of the earliest epochs, 0 through 30 or so, later epochs can decode stego-
images produced by encoders from any epoch belonging to the model with a great degree
of accuracy (very low bit-error). In other words, the asymptotic, downward sloping line
shows that most encoder/decoder pairs are compatible. After about 50 epochs of training,
inter-epoch, which is equivalent to intra-model, accuracy increases to over 95 percent. These
results therefore rule out extra training on a single model as the sole means to ratchet our
steganography algorithm forward. In this case, even an extra 200 epochs of training did not
produce a mutually unintelligible encoder/decoder pair, because as was mentioned above,
all the epochs are converging toward to the same solution.
















































Figure 4.2. Low intra-model bit-error for all encoder and decoder combinations
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Figure 4.3 contains the same data as Figure 4.2 but displayed in a different way. It can be
seen that for all encoder and decoder combinations above 100 epochs, the graph is solid
blue, indicating the corresponding bit-error for each of those combinations is less than .1.
On the other hand, the areas of the graph with cyan and red indicate high bit-error and
low compatibility, all involving encoder/decoder combinations with either the encoder or
decoder being low in number. To summarize, both Figures 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate that
as the model is trained, the encoder/decoder combinations with higher number epochs
generally show greater compatibility with one another.






















Figure 4.3. Threshold values of .4 and .1: blue indicates usable level of compat-
ibility, cyan indicates a collision (some compatibility), and red indicates virtually
no compatibility
4.1.2 Inter-model Decodability
The goal of this experiment was to determine the ability of separately initialized and trained
models to encode and decode stego-images produced by one another: in simpler terms,
we sought to answer the question, “are HiDDeN models unique”? Although, the original
HiDDeN researchers did not describe this exact experiment, they did perform experiments
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which showed “image distortion patterns produced by each trained model are unique” [25].
Rather than evaluate the ability of separately generated and trainedmodel’s ability to decode
each other’s stego-images, the researchers generated several models to train a state-of-the-art
machine-learning enabled steganalyzer [25]. It turns out that the steganalyzer trained on a
single model’s steganography was unable to detect the use of steganography by a separately
trained model, even though both models were generated using the HiDDeN algorithm, with
the only difference being the initialization seed [25].
For this second experiment, we trained two models with message length of 30 bits for 300
epochs and then evaluated the ability to encode and decode a randomly generated 30 bit
message using an encoder from one training epoch of one model and the decoder of a
training epoch from another other model. The experiment was conducted in a very similar
way to the previous experiment in that we tested every combination of encoder and decoder
pairs. The main difference between the two experiments was that in this case, encoders
and decoders were loaded from checkpoints of separate models rather than subsequent
training epochs belonging to the same model. Results displayed in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show
that inter-model decoding bit-error is consistently high, with a minimal bit-error for this
experiment being .39. The darker colored squares in 4.5 indicate a larger bit-error. Because
all encoders were matched with decoders from different models, it is unsurprising that high
bit-errors were observed for every tested combination. The graph was generated using a
diverging color-map to emphasize the near-randomness of the observed average bit-error
for each encoder/decoder combination. The fact that there are very few light colored squares
indicates that the decoder from even the most compatible encoder/decoder combinations
has a very limited ability to decode stego-images produced by another model. Although this
experiment was performed at a small scale, results showed each model unique it its ability
to encode and decode only images produced by the model itself. Our experiment’s results
in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 support the hypothesis from [25] that each trained model is unique
by demonstrating a near complete inability to perform inter-model encoding and decoding
of images. By demonstrating the inability of one model to decode stego-images produced
by another model, we showed the potential for developing a ratcheting mechanism which
generates unique steganographic solutions.
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Figure 4.4. High bit-error for encoders and decoders from different epochs
across multiple models
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Figure 4.5. Minimum bit-error greater than .4. No inter-model decoding
compatibility.
Our results showed that models are not only uniquely detectable, as shown by the original
researcherswhodeveloped theHiDDeNalgorithm, but that they are also uniquely decodable.
In this context, a model can be considered uniquely detectable if knowing the underlying
algorithmused does not affect an attacker’s ability to identify the use of that particularmodel.
Researchers showed that ML steganalysis techniques are only effective per individually
trained model and not across all HiDDeN models. In order words, if there are two HiDDeN
models, equivalent in all ways except for initialization seed, then effective steganalysis
techniques on one of the models will not inform effective steganalysis techniques for the
other.
Unique decodability refers to stego-images produced by each individually trainedmodel only
being decodable by that specificmodel. In otherwords, stego-images produced by onemodel
cannot be successfully decoded by another. In a simple non-multicast communications
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network, we need to create a model with unique decodability for each pair of users. In our
model, the weights of the final layers of the encoder and decoder serve as a steganographic
key. Therefore, we looked to altering model weights as a potential means to ratchet our
model forward. However, our ability to do this depends heavily on the “key space” for the
weights in the last layers of our encoder and decoder nets. Key space in this context refers
to the number of unique weight selections such that valid models that do not collide with
one another.
Before estimating the key space, we chose to test if ratcheting our model forward just one
time was even possible. It is important to note that because of the computation power and
time required to generate a single usable model, training each model from scratch for use
between two users is not feasible. For example, the time it took us to train a “usable” model
was several hours on relatively new GPUs (NVIDIA TITAN X). For our specific model we
achieved a bit-error less than .05 and a message length of 30 bits on 128 by 128 pixel cover
images. For training data, we utilized the entire 2017 COCO data-set as our training set.
Of course, there are ways to further reduce training time, such as reducing the size of our
training set, however, we mention the amount of time to emphasize the general degree of
time and energy required to train a new model from scratch. As we mentioned earlier in the
paper, 30 bits of message length is far from usable for our purposes; we need at least a few
thousand bits to fit a few sentences of ASCII-encoded text.
Therefore, even using state-of-the-art hardware, we cannot realistically ratchet our model as
it requires training from scratch every time.Developing a newmodel from scratch to generate
model weights to be used in a kind of key generation and exchange mechanism would hurt
overall stego-system usability because of time, power and computational requirements.
Additionally, training a functional model on a smartphone, or on multiple smartphones in
a distributed setup, is likely not possible in a reasonable amount of time. For example, the
Signal mobile app allows users to ratchet encryption keys almost instantaneously. Although
this is not a requirement for our model, users cannot be reasonably expected to wait hours
or days while background applications are training a model because energy consumption is
a limiting factor for mobile devices. Burning through a large percentage of a smartphone
battery’s capacity as users establish a new communications path is extremely inefficient and
not feasible for mass adoption. However, as previously shown, it appears that each separately
trained model is uniquely decodable. Ideally, we could distribute a pre-trained base model
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that can be minimally modified to be uniquely decodable.
4.2 Message Length and Capacity
The following section describes experiments which evaluate our model’s ability to meet the
character requirement referenced in Section 3.2.5 without affecting the visual impercepti-
bility requirement outlined in Section 3.2.1. Additionally, we explore the specific techniques
our model can learn to hide data and a method to increase encoding capacity.
4.2.1 Maximum Feasible Message Length
In order to be feasible, our model should scale to longer message lengths in order to decode
at least 280 ASCII characters as outlined in the previous chapter. The original authors of
the model used short message lengths (usually 50 bits or less) to perform most of their
experiments, perhaps in an effort to minimize training time. However, our model must be
able to handle a total message length of 2240 bits, equivalent to 280 bytes, with one byte
per character, as described in Section 3.2.5. We attempted to scale the model from a default
30 bit message length to a 280-byte message length with 128 by 128 images, which still
falls well below the researchers claimed capacity of .2 Bits Per Pixel (BPP) with a BPP
of less than .14. However, initial training proved extremely slow with the bit-error only
dropping to .45 after nearly a month of continuous training on NVIDIA TITAN X and GTX
2080 graphics cards. Although the model may eventually converge to a solution, given the
exorbitant amount of time required to train such a model, our efforts became focused on
other solutions to achieve a usable message length. After much trial and error, we settled
on using a message length of 64 bits which we determined to be a good balance of training
time and capacity. Although 64 bits is far from our stated capacity goal of 2240 bits, the
advantage of a 64 bit model lies in the relatively small amount of training time. The extra
training time required to train a 64 bit model over a 30 bit model is several hours whereas the
a 128 bit model requires at least a day of extra training time. Longer message length models,
in addition to failing to come close to the stated goal of 2240 bits, also require a significant
amount of training, considerably hurting model usability in two different ways. If we can
find an approach or specific implementation in which we can use frames or crops/tiles that
are embedded with 64 bits of message data each, we could satisfy our model’s requirements
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with as few as 35 frames or tiles. A 30 bit model would require at least 75 such frames or
tiles.
4.2.2 Effectiveness of Tiling Approach
Although 64 bits is a big improvement on 30 bits, it still only allows for encoding 8 ASCII
characters, meaning our program would not be able to encode the timeless phrase “Hello
World” and be limited to just “Hello Wo.” We identified two possible solutions to increase
overall image capacity. The first was to utilize animated GIFs or short videos and encode
each frame with 64 bits of data. With only 35 frames, which could be around one second
or less2, we would be able to meet our minimum capacity requirement of 280 characters.
However, this approach would involve dealing with a different image format, potentially
introducing new complications. For example, we would need to use existing GIFs or short
videos as our cover media, which significantly reduces the flexibility and usability of our
model. Additionally, there is the possibility that the steganography would be more visually
perceptible in this format. For example, if edge effects do exist, it may become more
obvious when the frames are displayed one at a time over one another. Therefore we decided
to pursue a second approach which involved slicing a cover image into many smaller tiles
and encoding each tile with a proportionate chunk of the overall message. In our experiment,
we first cropped an image into a square, sliced the cropped image into tiles, and then encoded
each tile with 64 bits of data, and finally stitched the image back together. In practice, on
the receiving end, the image would be sliced again, each individual tile decoded and the
encoded message from each tile would be concatenated together to reproduce the original
message.
Our first experiment was designed to determine if this approach was visually perceptible.
We trained multiple models with a 30 bit message length and crop sizes ranging from 16 by
16 to 128 by 128.We then took a cover image, 256 by 256 or larger, sliced it into smaller tiles
and encoded each “tile” with 30 bits worth of information. In the case of using a 256 by 256
cover image with 16 by 16 tiles, our total capacity is 256*256/(16*16) = 256 tiles holding
30 bits each, 256*30 = 7680 bits or 960 ASCII characters, far exceeding requirements for
our overall model. We used sample images similar to those in the COCO data set in terms
2Per the GIF98a specification, by setting the delay time in a GIF98A image, one can create GIF images
with a wide range of frame rates, from over 60 frames per second to less than one [39].
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of general characteristics like subject, lighting, size, etc. We chose to use images that were
typical representations of human life and that are the kinds of images commonly shared
by users of messaging applications, rather than solid colors and/or geometric patterns. We
tested different-sized images ranging from 128 by 128 to 1024 by 1024. In each case, we
kept the capacity ratio well below the HiDDeN authors’ standard of .2 BPP.
Results showed that generally, the use of smaller tiles, such as 16 by 16 and 32 by 32, was
more visually perceptible than larger tiles such as 128 by 128, but the differences in visual
perceptibility were not dramatic for tile sizes above 16 by 16. Additionally, increasing
the message length from 30 bits to 64 bits did not have a noticeable impact on visual
perceptibility. Most stego-images produced with the tiling approach showed faint box-like
artifacts that were noticeable in areas of the image with low entropy. For example, in our test
image of a shrew under a leaf, there was a dark, mostly mono-color area of the image. Such
areas that appear “smooth” and have very little texture seemed the most prone to artifacts,
but further testing is necessary to make any stronger claims about the relationship between
the types of images and textures used for cover images and artifacts observed in the resulting
stego-images. Although results did produce some visual artifacts, the initial results were
positive enough for us to continue testing the viability of this approach. Figure 4.6 shows
the limited visual perceptibility of the steganographic tiling approach, even with a small,
16 by 16 tile size. Although this test was repeated for two other images and showed similar
results, this experiment is merely an example meant to demonstrate potential feasibility for
further testing.
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(a) Cover image (b) Stego-image
Figure 4.6. Side-by-side comparison of cover image and stego-image using
tiling approach
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(a) Pixel differences (RGB) (b) SSIM
Figure 4.7. Side-by-side comparison of pixel differences and SSIM between
cover image and stego-image. (a) has been edited to increase brightness and
contrast for viewability/aesthetic purposes.
(a) Red (b) Green (c) Blue
Figure 4.8. Side-by-side comparison of differences in each color channel be-
tween cover image and stego-image. Lighter colored areas indicate greater
changes in pixel values. (a), (b), and (c) have been edited to increase bright-
ness and contrast for viewability/aesthetic purposes.
42
4.2.3 Determine where and how model encodes data in images
Inspired by mostly positive results in our testing of the tiling approach, our next experiments
were designed to identify issues with and solutions for improving the tiling approach by
analyzing exactly how the stego-image is modified. In other words, we wanted to provide at
least a limited view of the black box that is our steganographic ML-algorithm. Three sample
images that differed in content, color, and texture were used to test the hypothesis that low
entropy areas of an image are most prone to producing visually apparent “edge-effects”
in the stego-image. We computed the difference in pixel values for all color channels
in our cover images and stego-images. We also computed the SSIM between cover and
stego images [40]. Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show the parts of the image affected by the
steganography. Unsurprisingly, due to the minimal visually apparent differences between
the cover and the stego-image, the changes made to the cover image by the steganographic
model were small. Average pixel value changes per color channel were 4.02, 6.46, and 4.40
for blue, green and red channels, respectively. In the case our original shrew image, the
background has high levels of green and as our color channel analysis shows, the changes in
pixel values in the green channel were greater than changes in the other color channels. This
suggests that the HiDDeN algorithm makes the greatest changes to the most represented
color channels in the original image. However, because the algorithm behaves this way,
large changes are made to areas of the image with low entropy. As seen in Figure 4.8, the
highest concentration of changes in pixel values was in the area of the image containing the
green leaves. Because these changes were not evenly distributed throughout each tile, the
resulting stego-image contains a faint, but visually perceptible, cross-hatch pattern.
However, because each model generated by HiDDeN appears to be unique, it is unclear how
susceptible this model may be to statistical steganalysis of color channel differences. The
tiling process likely makes steganalysis easier due to the fact that the tiling frequency itself
is likely measurable via spectral analysis and can be used to differentiate between stego and
non-stego images (for more details see Section 5.1.1). Because the models generated by
HiDDeN appear to be unique, a claim made by the original authors and supported by both
their experiments and ours, described in Section 4.4, the specificways in which cover images
are modified or distorted should differ across models. However, exactly how much these
models differ in the specific ways they modify pixel values is unclear without further testing.
Therefore, further testing is necessary to determine the commonalities that exist between
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image distortion techniques utilized by different HiDDeN models. Determining potential
similarities between unique solutions could provide insight intomodel vulnerabilities against
steganalysis.
4.3 Modifying Model Weights to Generate New Models
In this section we explore several techniques to modify model weights to generate a unique
solution, as first described in Section 3.2.4.
4.3.1 Effectiveness of Ratcheting by Adding Random Noise to En-
coder/Decoder Weights
Our next experiment involved fine-tuning model weights from both the encoder and the
decoder by freezing all the neural networks’ layers except the last and then adding noise to
the weights of the last layers and performing additional training. The goal was to modify
the weights of the last layers in such a way that we could converge to a new solution. If we
could converge to a new solution, we would have a model that cannot decode stego-images
produced by other models with anything greater than 50 percent accuracy, and vice versa,
from previous iterations of the same base model. In this way, the weights in the last layers
of the encoder and decoder form the steganographic “private key.”
Our first method of adding weights to the last layers of the encoder and decoder was to
first calculate the mean and standard distribution of those layers’ weights and to generate
normally-distributed random noise based on those statistics. Once we added noise and
trained this new model for ten iterations, we then tested it for compatibility with previous
epochs of the same model from before noise was added to the weights. Immediately after
noise was added, several error metrics increased drastically such as the encoder MSE, loss
and bit-error between pre-noise added and post-noise added epochs. This indicated to us that
adding weights to the model significantly impacted the model’s functionality, particularly
the basic ability to encode and decode a given message from a given cover image. However,
as the model trained, the loss metrics for post-noise added epochs slowly decreased. After
scaling theweights down by half by performing element-wisemultiplication of each element
in the noise array by .5, we discovered that the new model was usable, in that it achieved
a bit-error very close to zero, .01, after only 1 epoch of additional training, and that all
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trained epochs after noise was added to the last layers of both the encoder and decoder were
incompatible, seeing a decoding bit-error of .48, with epochs from before noise was added.
Strictly speaking, an image encoded with a encoder taken from a pre-noise-added epoch
cannot be decoded with a decoder taken from a post-noise added epoch: adding random
noise to the final layers of the encoder and decoder essentially produces a completely new
model with its own unique steganographic technique.
Noise added in between 
epoch 300 and 301
Figure 4.9. Effect of adding noise to last layers of encoder and decoder neural
net and additional training on decoding bit-error
Figure 4.9 shows that adding noise and performing one additional epoch of training produces
a completely new model. This experiment demonstrated the ability to add random noise
and perform additional training to ratchet our model forward. In order to confirm that we
can reliably ratchet models forward by adding random noise to the last layer in the encoder
and decoder neural nets, we needed to be able to reproduce the results. Specifically, we
needed to show that by adding noise, we can create a large number of new models that has
no backward compatibility with epochs from before the noise was added nor with any other
models.
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4.3.2 Determine Minimum and Maximum Thresholds for Adding Noise
to Model Weights to Obtain New Solution
The following experiments were designed to test the appropriate level of noise to simul-
taneously maximize convergence speed, maximize inter-model bit-error, and minimize
intra-model bit-error. For example, if too much noise is added, the model either will not
converge or be slow to converge. On the other hand, if too little noise is added, the inter-
model bit-error will be too low as each model’s solution is too similar to other existing
models. In this situation, we may observe speedy convergence but also many collisions, in
the form of low inter-model bit-error.
Although a scaled-down version of random noise, with a scaling factor of .5, was effective in
the previous experiment, further testing showed a noise scale of .5 and even .75 to produce
a model that has a significantly lower average inter-model bit-error than those shown in
Figures 4.4 and 4.5. To be specific, the scaling of weights was conducted by multiplying the
standard deviation of the encoder’s and decoder’s final weights by .5, respectively. Rather
than a mean bit-error of .5, which is what is required to have a sufficiently different model,
the actual average bit-error was closer to .4. Only after increasing the noise scaling to 1 did
we see results showing an average bit-error approaching .5.
Additionally, it is important to note the importance of the optimizer in minimizing training
time and converging to a new solution. The goal of this experiment and several following
experiments is to produce a new, unique model from a previously trained model as quickly
as possible. In the first several iterations of these experiments we did not adequately predict
the importance of the optimizer and the optimizer state. A ML optimizer is used to identify
and adjust the parameters that have the greatest role in reducing a given cost function. In
ML, the cost function calculates the difference between predicted and observed values and
serves to minimize somemetric, such as loss, error, or cost. Certain optimization algorithms
are better-suited towards certain applications and can significantly affect convergence speed.
The particular model we chose to modify, the original HiDDeN model, utilizes an Adam
optimizer [25]. Adam is known for its typical “out-of-the-box” usability and minimal hyper-
parameter tuning requirements [41]. One key characteristic of Adam is that it has adaptive
learning rates for each parameter that are calculated by using decaying averages of previous
gradients [41]. In other words, previously performed training informs how the algorithm
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will take into account current training metrics. By adding random noise to the final layers
of our encoder and decoder we are seeking to force the model to converge to a new solution,
which is typically the opposite problem that most ML applications are designed to solve.
Typically, ML models are designed to converge to the best possible solution, whereas in our
case, we are attempting to converge to a completely new, unrelated solution. In other words,
we are trying to “jump” out of a local minimum, which can be graphed as a sort of ravine,
with the magnitude of the jump being the amount of noise we add. By adding noise and
then continuing training, we try to find a new minimum. Therefore, once we add noise, we
no longer want to take our previous optimizer gradients into account: we need to reset the
state of the optimizer in order to converge to a new solution as quickly as possible. In other
words, by resetting the optimizer, we are wiping the optimizer’s memory of the old solution
so that it can converge to a new solution more quickly. A stateless optimizer, which has
no such memory, such as stochastic gradient descent, would not converge faster or slower
based on previous values because those previous values are ignored.
The previous experiments were replicated with the addition of re-initializing the optimizer
whenever random noise was added to the final layers of our encoders and decoders. As
predicted, the models for which the optimizer was re-initialized converged significantly
faster, 2 epochs versus 5 epochs, than those for which the optimizer was not re-initialized.
From this point forward, unless explicitly specified, it can be assumed by the reader that
any further experiments involving model generation by altering model weights included
re-initializing the Adam optimizer.
4.3.3 Re-initializing Neural Network Layers vs. Adding Random Noise
Now that we had found a potential mechanism for ratcheting our model, we sought to
determine if there were any other better approaches. We evaluated the effectiveness of
adding random noise to our encoder and decoder final neural net layers against completely
re-initializing those same last layers. Results showed that the models for which the final
layers of the encoder and decoder were re-initialized, convergedmuchmore quickly, training
for 1 epoch as opposed to 5 or more epochs, to lower bit-error solutions than those generated
by adding random noise. Furthermore, results also showed that models generated in this
way were also less susceptible to collisions than random-noise-added generated models.
By collisions we are referring to generated models that have at least some ability to encode
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and decode stego-images produced by one another, indicated by average inter-model bit-
error below .4. When graphed, these semi-compatible models can be easily identified with
lighter coloring, showing low bit-error rates, less than .4, between encoder and decoders
of different models. In summary, by re-initializing the optimizer and both final layers of
the encoder/decoder neural nets and performing additional training, we decreased the intra-
model bit-error rates, increased inter-model bit-error rates, and decreased training time for
model convergence. Specifically, we reduced training time by 3 epochs, from 5 to 3, while
also observing a greater average decoding bit-error between all encoders and decoders. The
random-noise adding method, shown in Figure 4.12, resulted in an average bit-error of .45
while the re-initialization method, shown in Figure 4.13, resulted in an average bit-error of
.49, which is apparent in the lower number of collisions seen in the re-initialization method.
4.3.4 Approximate Risk of Collision of Star-generated Models (Estimate
Maximum Number of Unique Ratcheted Solutions From Same
Base Model)
After initial success in ratcheting our model forward one time, we sought to estimate the
number of unique solutions we can arrive at after ratcheting our model forward one time.
To clearly delineate the difference between ratcheting, which involves serially creating new
models with an inability to go backwards, and generating multiple new models from the
same pre-trained base model via re-initializing the final layers of our encoder and decoder
nets, we shall refer to the latter as a Star-Generated Model (SGM). The name comes from
the star pattern created by generating many models from the same base model as shown
in Figure 4.10. Figure 4.11 shows how our ratcheted models are generated and will be
discussed in the next subsection. Additionally, it should be noted that the following test of
the SGM was performed without resetting the optimizer as this experiment was performed
before the optimizer re-initialization experiment. Results are shown in Figure 4.12. For
comparison, Figure 4.13 shows results for the same experiment except with re-initialization
of both the optimizer and parameters, highlighting the importance of both re-initialization
procedures.
Like in our first ratcheting experiment, for this SGM experiment we start with a pre-
trained model and add random noise to our final layers of the encoder and decoder nets


















Figure 4.11. Ratcheted model
experiment, added random noise scaled by .5 and trained for 2 epochs 100 times. The
goal of this experiment was to generate 100 new solutions by adding noise and training.
We then evaluated each model’s ability to encode/decode images generated by each other.
Results show the average bit-error between supposedly “unique” models is less than .5,
close to .4, indicating that there is still some capacity to encode and decode between these
models, which does not meet our requirements. Additionally not all models achieved a low
enough bit-error to be considered usable (we require < .05). Some solutions still produced
a bit-error approaching .1. Furthermore, certain solutions were much more compatible with
many other solutions, with a cluster of inter-model bit errors as low as .15. These clusters
are shown as clusters cyan dots in Figure 4.12. This means that our experiment produced
models that still have some ability to decode the steganography generated by other models,
which is counter to our goals. All of these results point to several potential issues with
the experiment. One possibility is that the scaling value for the random noise was too
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high (.5), which would explain the low average inter-model bit-error. Another issue, the
sometimes high bit-error seen in a single model’s encoding and decoding is that the model
was not trained long enough. Finally, another possible reason for these results was due to
not resetting the optimizer, which can affect a model’s ability to converge to a new solution.
For our next sub-experiment, in order to increase the average inter-model bit-error and
reduce the intra-model bit-error, we chose to increase the scale of added random noise to
1 and increase the number of epochs trained to 5 from the 2 epochs we used in the SGM
experiment.
Following the results of our optimizer re-initialization experiments, we reproduced the above
ratcheting experiment with the addition of re-initializing the optimizer and re-initializing
the final layers of the encoder and decoder rather than adding random noise. As shown
in Figures 4.12 and 4.13, results were very positive as they showed a marked decrease
in the number of model collisions, which can be identified as cyan dots in both figures,
and decreased intra-model bit-error, which can be seen in darker purple dots along y=x in
the diverging colormap sub-figure in Figure 4.13. Smaller intra-model bit-error indicates
greater decoding accuracy and fewer collisions indicate the inability of separate models to
decode one another’s stego-images, a requirement established in Section 3.2.4. Although
the bit-error threshold graph pictured in Figure 4.13(a) still contains 8 total collisions, 8
is far fewer than the numerous collisions visible in the corresponding graph contained in
Figure 4.12. The diverging colormap graphs featured in both Figures 4.12(b) and 4.13(b)
display the same data as displayed in (a) of their corresponding Figure but in a slightly
different way. The diverging colormap uses a gradual scale that gives the reader a more
detailed understanding of the relative differences in observed bit-error.
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Figure 4.12. Bit-error between encoders and decoders from star-generated
models using random noise added to encoder/decoder final layers and with-
out re-initializing the optimizer.














































Figure 4.13. Bit-error between encoders and decoders from star-generated
models using reinitialized encoder/decoder final layers and reinitialized opti-
mizer.
4.3.5 Estimate maximum number of times model can be ratcheted for-
ward
In the last experiment we produced 100 models generated from the same base model and
examined the number of valid models and collisions. As our model requirement was to not
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produce collisions, we had limited success via our SGMmethod in that we only produced 8
collisions out 100 total models. Additionally, although we defined a collision as a bit-error
below .4, a collision with a value of .39 is less concerning than one of .1, and the fact that
we did not see any collisions with bit-error below .3 is notable.
For the following experiments, like in the SGM experimentation, the initial versions of
ratcheting experimentation did not involve re-initializing the optimizer. We tested the num-
ber of times a single model could be ratcheted forward by adding random noise to the final
layers of a model’s encoder and decoder. Specifically, we took the same pre-trained model
as used in previous experiments and added noise with .5 scaling, trained for two epochs
and then repeated until we ended up with a model that was not usable because the average
bit-error between non-corresponding epochs was too low ( .4), with edge cases where it
dropped as low as .15. It is because of these results that we only trained for two epochs: the
already low bit-error between non-corresponding encoder/decoder pairs was unlikely to in-
crease with further training and it was apparent the noise scaling was too low. These results
were similar to our initial test of the SGM using noise scaling of .5. We then increased the
scaling of the random noise to 1 and trained for five epochs. Initial results showed that the
minimum intra-model bit-error was still rather high, greater than .1, so we increase training
to ten epochs rather than five. We increased the number of epochs as we increased the scale
of the noise added to allow for extra required training time for the model to converge to a
new solution.
Although the noise scaling and length of training were changed significantly, we observed
a similar pattern of results: the model worked well for several ratchet iterations but bit-error
steadily increased with the number of times the model was ratcheted. After discovering the
pivotal role of re-initializing the optimizer, in addition to then re-initializing the optimizer,
we repeated the above experiment and re-initialized the final layers of the encoder and
decoder rather than add random noise. Results improved drastically, as shown in Figure 4.15,
and appeared similar to the SGM results: minimal collisions and low intra-model decoding
bit-error rates. Specifically, convergence was much quicker, bit-error was very low for
corresponding encoder and decoder pairs and high for non-corresponding pairs.
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Figure 4.14. Bit-error between encoders and decoders from ratcheted models
using random noise and not re-initializing optimizer.











































Figure 4.15. Bit-error between encoders and decoders from ratcheted models
using reinitialized encoder/decoder final layers and reinitialized optimizer.
4.4 Vulnerability to Steganalysis
In this section we describe several experiments to evaluate our model’s resistance to ste-
ganalysis.
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4.4.1 Determine Bit-Error Distribution
In this experiment we sought to determine the distribution of bit-errors for a given test image
over multiple models. For example, if we have a model that has a .1 decoding bit-error, for
which bits are those errors happening? Is the third bit more likely to have an error than the
second? In other words, we wanted to determine if the errors are independently distributed
or if they follow some sort of pattern. Answering this question is important because it can
have a significant effect on an adversary’s ability to perform steganalysis and can tell us
if interleaving in the form of adding error-correcting codes is necessary. If we determine
that stego-images generated by the HiDDeN algorithm will cause non-uniform distribution
of bit errors when attempting to decode the embedded message, then we will have created
a simple steganalysis tool. If the the bit-error distribution is uniform, then the image in
question was not likely created with HiDDeN.
For this test, pictured on Figure 4.16(a), we modified the previous encoding/decoding
compatibility tests. We looked at one model over 3 epochs and tested all encoder and
decoder combinations. For each encoder/decoder pair, we generated a random thirty-bit
string, encoded our test image, decoded it and recorded the position of any decoding
errors in a 30 length counter vector. This was performed for one thousand iterations on each
encoder/decoder pair.We then took the counter vector and graphed it as a histogram,with the
x-axis as a 0-29 bit position and the y-axis indicating the number of total errors experienced.
Due to the way in which the experiment was conducted, the inter-model decoding bit-error ,
intra-model bit-error, and the observed decoding bit-error when decoding non-stego images
is spread out across the histogram. It is apparent from the graph that the bit errors were
not distributed randomly. Figure 4.16(b) contains results of an experiment decoding only
non-stego images and testing the decoded string against randomly generated bit-strings. As
one would expect, due to the fact that no actual encoding has taken place, the errors are
distributed quite evenly across all bit positions reflecting the randomness of each new thirty
bit string tested. Finally, the graph pictured in Figure 4.16(c) shows the distribution of bit
errors in a single, “fully” trained model. In this context “fully” trained refers to a model that
has an average bit-error of less than .05 when decoding stego-images that it has generated.
Even though the bit-error rate is low, the errors that do occur are highly concentrated in
certain bit positions, in this case, bits 15 and 17. The fact that both inter-model and intra-
model bit errors appear not to be randomly distributed indicates that this model is likely
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very vulnerable to steganalysis techniques that analyze the distribution of bit-errors.
(a) Inter-model and intra-
model bit-error
(b) Bit-error for non-stego im-
ages
(c) Intra-model bit-error for sin-
gle model
Figure 4.16. Comparison of relative bit-error position across multiple models
(a), against cover images only (b), and within a single epoch/model (c).
After initial testing showed that bit errors were generally not distributed randomly, we
performed several more experiments inspired by an adversarial approach. In this case, as
described in Section 3.1, we assume that our adversary has passive access to all images sent
via this communication channel and also to a functional steganographic, HiDDeN-based
model, to include SGM and ratcheted models. Although our adversary may have access
to various models, we assume that the adversary does not have access to the test model.
In other words, the adversary does not know the weights/keys used for the tested pair of
users’ steganographic model. In this experiment scenario, the adversary can use its model
to attempt to decode any images passed over the network. For example, it can take a known
plaintext string as a stand-in for some secret message and test stego-images produced by
other models, and by analyzing the distribution of bit-errors determine if the tested/decoded
image is a stego-image or a cover image. Although the adversary could guess the specific
message, such as a banned keyword, and test the decoded messages from random images
against it, the success of the attack is not dependent on the choice of known plaintext. A
successful attack does not give the adversary access to the original message, but instead
the distribution of decoding bit-errors in a given image will tell the adversary if the tested
image in stego-image or a non stego-image.
The following experiment is split into two parts. For the first part, we took a plaintext 30-bit
string and encoded it using steganographic model A into 2000 random images. We assume
that this string is known to the adversary. We then took a separate steganographic model,
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model B, and used it to decode the stego-images produced by model A, and then calculated
the decoding bit-error. We calculated the bit-error by testing the decoded value against
the original plaintext string and recorded the bit position of each error. This tests whether
an adversary who has obtained a legitimate copy of the overall steganographic model can
viably use it to test whether or not steganography using the underlying algorithm has been
used on a given image. We use a separate model for encoding, model A, and decoding,
model B, in this experiment because we assume that the adversary does not have access to
every unique solution/model weights that the algorithm can generate. The cover images are
tested to see if there is a significant difference in the distribution of bit-errors in stego- vs.
non-stego/cover images.


















(a) Stego-images produced by separate model

















(b) Cover images only
Figure 4.17. Position of bit-errors in decoding known plaintext string in stego-
images produced by another model compared versus cover images.
As can be seen from both graphs in Figure 4.17, bit-errors were distributed non-randomly
in decoding both stego-images produced by another model and in decoding cover images,
with no encoding whatsoever. Even though both sub-experiments showed non-random
distribution, the bit-error distribution seen when decoding stego-images is significantly
different from that seen when decoding cover images. These results are significant because
they imply that an adversary could use this simple statistical analysis technique to determine
whether or not an image is a stego-image. This property of the HiDDeN model, and
potentially other ML-generated steganographic models is potentially a serious flaw as it
essentially breaks the underlying model by giving an adversary a low-cost technique to
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identify stego-images. Although the contents cannot necessarily be decoded, especially if
the message is also encrypted, the main advantage of using steganography in the first place,
covertness, is gone.
4.4.2 Test Stego-Images Against Common Steganalysis Techniques
In order to verify that our modified version of the HiDDeN model was still resistant to
common steganalysis techniques, as the original developers of the algorithm claimed, we
performed several steganalytic attacks against the model. For each test, we generated 20
total stego-images each encoded with a with random 30-bit string, specifically 10 stego-
images were generated by each model, and 20 cover images and recorded the number of
positive detections of steganography for each statistical technique. Testing was performed
using steganography researcher Daniel Lerch’s steganalysis program, Aletheia [42]. The
title of the tables indicate how many separate models were used to generate stego-images.
For example, the table titled “Two HiDDeNModels” shows results of statistical steganalysis
techniques against 20 total stego-images, with 10 stego-images being generated by each
model. The table titled “One Ratcheted Model” shows results for steganalysis against 10
stego-images from one model and 10 cover images.
Two HiDDeN Models
Positive Detections




















Although statistical techniques appear to be ineffective against the SGM models, initial
results suggest ratchetedmodels appear to be vulnerable. In our experiment testing statistical
attacks against stego-images generated by two ratcheted models, these attacks were nearly
twice as likely to detect the use of steganography in stego-images than in cover images.
Because of these initial resultswe ran another test, this time testing stego-images produced by
one ratcheted model. Results show similar detection rates between stego- and cover images,
suggesting the results from the previous experiment may be an aberration. However, in











Conclusions, Challenges and Future Research
Although our results showed potential for the successful implementation of an adaptive ML
generated steganographic model, it also identified several key challenges. Our research has
shown ways in which some of these challenges can be mitigated but continued research is
required. The following section explores observations and conclusions from our research.
5.1 Conclusions
Our research results highlight several main areas of concern to include model message
length, the importance of implementing error-correcting codes, and our model’s weakness
to basic statistical steganalysis techniques.
5.1.1 Message Length
One major shortcoming of our chosen model, the HiDDeNmodel, developed by researchers
at Stanford University [25], was identified very early on in the research process; the inabil-
ity to train a usable model on longer message lengths, greater than 128 bits. Our stated
requirement of 280 characters (2240 bits) far exceeds the message lengths we were able to
successfully train even after weeks of training on modern GPUs. Without an ability to train
a model than can reliably encode and decode more than a word or two, the model would not
meet our requirements. However, this approach may be suitable for some alternate channel
with high message frequency and small payloads, such as preview thumbnails.
Therefore, we chose to investigate whether or not it would be effective to slice an image
into smaller tiles and use a smaller message length model to encode data in each tile. The
recipient would then slice the sent stego-image into the same tiles and decode each one in
a certain order, and concatenate the data to decode the original data. Our results showed
that depending upon the entropy of the given image, this approach produces some visual
artifacts, although they are sometimes quite hard to see. This is due to the specific technique
the model has learned to use to encode data. Parts of an image which contained mostly a
single color (low entropy) were quite susceptible to visual artifacts because the majority
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of the modified bits were in the middle of the image, producing something similar to a
cross-hatch pattern over multiple tiles, which likely makes detection by steganalysis easier.
Spectral analysis of the imagemay reveal a signal at the tiling frequency. This effect could be
further mitigated by restricting the images that could be used with this model to those with
high entropy. However, that would negatively impact the usability of this model. Another
potential solution is to add noise around the edges of each tile. Because most of the encoded
data is located in the middle of those low entropy tiles, this approach should not have a
great effect on the decoder’s ability to accurately decode the original bit string. However,
further testing is required to determine if commonly used edge softening techniques affect
decoding bit error in a slicing and tiling solution.
5.1.2 Implementing Error Correcting Codes
The use of error correcting codes can be useful on two fronts: further reducing intra-model
bit error, and creating a more uniform distribution of bit errors. By measuring the relative
frequency of bit errors experienced when attempting to decode a stego-image generated by
a HiDDeN model, we showed that the the error distribution is far from uniform. On the
other hand, when decoding a non-stego image against a known plaintext, the model’s bit
error distribution was quite different and not uniform. Assuming this software is open and
available to everyone, a threat actor could easily obtain their own unique model. Once an
attacker obtains their ownmodel, they can then conduct the attack described in Section 4.4.1
to determine whether a given image is a stego-image produced by the HiDDeN algorithm.
This technique does not require the attacker knows the original bit string used for encoding.
The attacker only needs to use a constant known plaintext in order to generate a bit-error
distribution which acts as a kind of fingerprint for the use of steganography.
This steganalysis via observation of bit error distribution would be complicated by the
use of an error correcting code. Error correcting codes use interleaving or permutation
which scramble the bits over code words and thus affect the distribution of errors [43]. By
first adding an error correcting code to a message and then encoding it with our model,
we would then decode the message with our model and apply the error correcting code to
reduce errors. Although this may reduce and even completely prevent most errors, assuming
the distributed model already has a very low bit error, this still does not prevent an adversary
with full remote access to a device from testing for the use of steganography. Therefore,
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we must implement cryptography. Because steganography and cryptography have different
goals, there is an opportunity to achieve the “best of both worlds” by combining them
into one overall framework. Steganography provides covertness and cryptography provides
confidentiality, integrity, and/or authentication, depending on the implementation.
5.1.3 Resisting Steganalysis
Our aim is to ensure that our framework is resistant to today’s most widely used steganalysis
techniques. Our initial testing showed that HiDDeN models and our SGM and ratchet-
generated models appear resistant to statistical steganalysis. However, a major weakness
was identified in the experiments exploring the model’s bit-error distribution. Our results
show that bit-errors from decoding stego-images, even from other models, are distributed in
a much different way than the errors observed when decoding cover/non-stego images. The
known plaintext statistical analysis experiment outlines a simple approach for identifying
stego-images produced by the HiDDeN model. Without even exploring the multitude of
other steganalysis techniques that exist, we have already identified a major flaw. In order
to create a viable steganographic model, this weakness would have to be overcome. It is
unclear whether or not this can be fixed without substantive structural changes to the model.
5.2 Challenges and Future Work
This section discusses key challenges and considerations for futurework related to designing,
building, and distributing a ML steganographic model for anti-censorship communication.
5.2.1 Maximizing Entropy: Avoid Collisions and Increase Security
Through our experiments, we learned that adding random noise to the final layers of our
encoder and decoder was not as effective as completely re-initializing those layers in terms
of convergence speed and avoiding collisions. However, due to the Pytorch implementation
of this re-initialization, namely the “reset_parameters()” method that is called for the respec-
tive encoder and decoder final neural net layers, the specific re-initialization method is not
obvious. According to Pytorch’s Github code repository, calling the “reset_parameters()”
method for a ConvXd or Linear neural network uses a Kaiming initialization, also known
as He initialization [44]. He initialization uses a scaled uniform distribution that takes
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into account non-linear rectifiers [45]. Python’s documentation states that the random()
function’s underlying C implementation utilizes a Mersenne Twister, a commonly used
Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) [46]. The documentation also states that the
Mersenne Twister is both “completely deterministic” and “completely unsuitable for cryp-
tographic purposes” [46]. Although the implementation of this PRNG in our steganographic
framework is not cryptographic in nature, we seek to maximize security to the greatest
extent possible and thus want to avoid using Python’s random() function. Python documen-
tation suggests using the included “os.urandom()” function which it claims is suitable for
cryptographic purposes [47]. The documentation claims this method utilizes at least one
“OS-specific randomness source” to add noise to the random number generation process.
Our framework would benefit from this enhanced security. Beyond Python’s own built-in
methods, a popular technology that uses natural randomness inherent in the integrated cir-
cuit manufacturing process are Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF)s [48]. PUFs utilize
this variability to generate “device-unique, unclonable keys” [48].Whereas Python’s built-in
“os.urandom()” function relies on software-based system entropy, PUFs rely on hardware.
By generating random numbers using additional sources of noise, such as from operating
systems or hardware, we are patching a potential threat vector. This ensures the uniqueness
of individually trained models’ weights. As we treat the weights of our models as keys,
we can think of the process to generate weights from random seeds, which in a ML
context would be in the form of parameter initialization, as a sort of Key Distribution
Function (KDF). By utilizing both a random seed and the output of PUF or software-based
source of randomness as input to our KDF or parameter/weight initialization process, we
can transmit those keys/weights directly, or if we wish to add a level of abstraction, transmit
the underlying random seed and PUF output. Although less efficient than transmitting the
weights directly, these pre-inputs can be used to initialize and train a congruent model
on another user’s device, thereby creating a symmetric communications channel. In this
context, by symmetric communications channel, we mean two users that have identical
steganographic models, allowing them to encode, send, and decode stego-images between
themselves with an extremely low chance of an adversary being able to either detect the
use of steganography or read the contents of the encoded message. In order to protect the
contents of our message, we must incorporate cryptography.
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5.2.2 Implementing Cryptography
In the event that the adversary obtains our unique model, including its weights, and the
ability to ratchet the model identically to the users, our steganographic solution has failed.
The entire point of using steganography is to send secret messages without being detected.
In this event, although the model may be compromised, there is still hope to prevent our
adversary from reading the contents of our messages by implementing cryptography. In
general, cryptography has been studied more extensively than steganography and certain
algorithms and protocols possess provable security guarantees.
5.2.3 Developing an Integrated Framework: Steganography, Error-
Correcting Codes, and Cryptography
In the section discussing error correcting codes above,we began discussing a protocol for two
users, Alice and Bob, to communicate with our model.We discussed adding error correcting
codes prior to embedding the secret message in the cover image. In the cryptography section,
we discussed basic concepts but did not directly discuss how in might be implemented with
steganography. Below, we will outline the steps necessary to integrate cryptography within
our model.
This model makes two main assumptions: the first is that Alice and Bob have already
negotiated a value to use for an initialization seed with which to ratchet their model to the
same solution. In other words, they need some type of key agreement protocol. Once they
agree upon an initialization seed, they can then train for a set number of epochs, allowing
the model to re-converge to a solution. Only at this point will Alice and Bob have two nearly
identical, fully compatible stego-models. The second major assumption our above model
makes is that implementing cryptography will not require any extra round trips of data
exchange. This assumption is false. In order to accomplish the cryptographic key agreement
process, several messages need to be exchanged before the content can be encrypted. The
following is a list of the necessary steps to incorporate both ECC and cryptography with
our model:
1. Alice, the sender, drafts the message to be embedded
2. Alice encrypts the message.
3. Alice adds error-correcting code to the message.
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4. Alice encodes encrypted message with error code into cover image with stegano-
graphic model shared between Alice and Bob.
5. Bob decodes the message using steganographic model he shares with Alice.
6. Bob applies ECC to message to correct errors.
7. Bob decrypts the original message.
5.2.4 End-Device Computing Power Limitations
A major challenge to the implementation of our framework is the computational power
involved in training. In our experiments, we utilized modern, high-end GPU’s. Although
initial experimentation proved successful, due to time and prioritization of potential exper-
iments, mobile devices were not tested. However, Pytorch does offer a mobile platform for
iOS, Android and Linux [49]. In order to verify that our model is feasible, future experi-
ments should involve training and testing our model on mobile hardware. Throughout our
experimentation, it became obvious how important it is to optimize training techniques to
our hardware. For example, selecting an appropriately large batch size can significantly re-
duce training time. For some of our early experiments, we relied in the default programmed
batch size that was significantly smaller than what our GPU memory could hold. Therefore,
the bottleneck we experienced was likely input/output related.We were only using a fraction
of the available GPU memory. Once this bottleneck was identified, subsequent training was
significantly faster. All this goes to show the importance of appropriately matching and
optimizing software techniques for the hardware being used. By appropriately optimizing
our techniques, we significantly reduce training time. In the case of increasing the batch
size, changing one parameter led to a massive increase in performance. The same attention
should be paid to experiments on mobile devices. Without dedicated GPUs, Compute Uni-
fied Device Architecture (CUDA) will no longer be a viable option and the original code
may have to be modified. It may even be the case that the computation required by our
model framework is too high to be run on a single device and may have to be run in parallel
on multiple devices.
5.2.5 Key Space
In our experiment testing the feasibility of the SGM, we showed that for 100 models
generated, there was a minimum of 8 collisions in the experiment set. For the random noise
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addition approach, far more collisions were observed. Although the specific bit-error values
that qualified as collisions were rather close to the threshold, values approaching .4 but still
less than .4, 8 collisions out of 100 total is still unacceptable. For example, if we were to
implement SGM at a large scale, increasing the total number of communicating pairs of
users to 100,000, to provide pairs of users unique keys/weights for their models, a minimum
of 8,000 collisions would be produced and likely far more, as the available “key space”
(number of possible unique weights generating distinct models) is constant.
In order to evaluate our model’s ability to scale, one might take a systemic approach by first
exploring the theoretical bounds of the “key space” and justify that with testing. Depending
on the initial results obtained from this approach, heuristics-based testing to estimate the
key space may be useful, beyond the type of limited-scope model generation feasibility
experiments described in our research. Estimating the key space for this model would
require creating many individual models from scratch, training them until convergence, and
then evaluating the range of different values obtained for the weights of the final layers of
the encoders and decoders. This is a way of determining what kind of values result in a
“usable” model (i.e. a model with intra-model bit-error < .05). It may be the case that the
key space is too small to accommodate large number of users, or pairs of users. If it is the
case that the total possible number of “unique” models is small, say less than 1 billion, then
just using the weights of the final layers of the encoder and decoder as keys is insufficient.
It would be possible to also use weights from other layers of the encoder and decoder to
increase the total key space; however, this would increase required training time to generate
a new model. Future work exploring generating new models with the HiDDeN algorithm
via re-initialzing the final layers of the encoder and decoder should first explore the overall
key space within those final layers.
5.2.6 Key and Model Distribution
One of the main difficulties in both steganography and cryptography is key distribution, or
the process of securely sending keys to users. Historically, in cryptography, this problem
was solved using an alternate, secure communications channel to send cryptographic keys
that would be used to secure another communications channel. For example, a courier with a
message could physically deliver amessage containing a secret key that could be used by two
parties communicating via telegraph to create a secure communications channel. In 1976,
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this out-of-band, cryptographic bootstrapping problem was initially solved by Whitfield
Diffie andMartin Hellman when they developed an asymmetric protocol that required users
to exchange values across a public, insecure channel and then combine them using modular
exponentiation, enabling each user to generate the same shared secret key [50].
Given that our steganographic model uses weights as “keys,” a similar approach may be
possible to send the keys across a public channel. However, it is important to keep in mind
that in this case, the key are the weights of our model, which directly determine exactly
how messages are encoded into cover images. A suitable protocol would require that the
final key/weights obtained by each user not only be equivalent, but also result in a valid ML
solution. In this context, the weights are more than just a shared secret: they are the recipe
for exactly how the algorithm is implemented and a key exchange protocol that somehow
mixes inputs from two users must result in a usable set of weights that correlates with a
valid steganographic solution that encodes and decodes images with a low bit-error.
Another possible alternative to an asymmetric steganographic key exchange protocol is to
send the keys in a secure, out-of-band communications channel, such as an encrypted email,
message or even a physical, hand-carried message. However, many authoritarian regimes
do not allow the use of encrypted email or messaging and if one can deliver hand-carried
messages in person, it begs the question of why they would be using digital steganography
to pass secret messages to begin with.
5.2.7 Ensuring User Access to Download and Use Application
As discussed in the first chapter, themain challenge to the spread and use of privacy-enabling
mobile applications in mainland China is that the Chinese government is likely to eventually
ban such an application. Signal, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and in February of 2021,
Clubhouse, have all been banned by the Chinese government and are no longer available for
download or use inMainlandChina. In the case of our steganographic framework, we require
running a plugin-type application alongside/on top of an existing messaging application.
If we can first overcome the bootstrapping problem of enabling a user to download our
application to his or her device, ideally via some easily accessible application marketplace
such as the Google Play Store or the Apple App Store. Other potential solutions could be
Peer to Peer (P2P) file-sharing or even in-person sharing of physical storage devices that
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contain the program.
5.2.8 Building and Integrating the Mobile Application
Although we have discussed many technical challenges to building a mobile steganographic
communications solution, we have not yet discussed the inherent difficulty of both building
a usable mobile application and successfully integrating this application to an existing one.
Specifically, for our model requirement to be fully satisfied, our mobile application would
function as a plugin for an already widely used messaging application adding functionality
while utilizing the communication backbone of that application.
One of the major issues we face with the development of such an application is that
many messaging platforms do not support “unofficial” plugins. For example, published
WeChat policy states that “emulators and unofficial plugins endanger security and are
strictly prohibited” [51]. Therefore, at least in the case of developing a solution compatible
with WeChat, we would either need to subvert the mechanism that detects the use of
the unofficial plugin or separate our mobile application entirely, in terms of inter-process
communication and Application Programming Interface (API). Both approaches introduce
their own complications. The first approach, to circumvent the detection of unofficial plugins
by the original application developer, may involve a significant software reverse engineering
effort as the mechanisms to detect such behavior are likely unpublished and not obvious.
The main downside is that significant time and effort are required just to understand how
the detection process takes place. If this can be determined, then there is still the question
of whether or not it can be circumvented.
The second approach avoids the unofficial plugin problem by building an application on
top of WeChat that uses WeChat’s user interface as an API rather than directly interacting
with the AI itself. By simulating a user, the application can interact directly with WeChat
without interfacing with the official API. The program could automatically enter text or
attach selected images in WeChat. This second application would produce a stego-image to
be sent via a messaging application, and then automatically attach and send in themessaging
application. If we successfully implemented this approach, in order to send a stego-image
the user would first need to open our application, select a cover image and enter the text
to be encoded, press some kind of a button to produce and save the stego-image, and the
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program would then automatically open the main messaging application, attach the stego-
image, and send it to the desired recipient. The recipient would then need to open our
mobile application. The mobile application would automatically copy the received stego-
image from the messaging application to our mobile application, which would then decode
and display the message. Because our application is completely separate from the main
messaging application, it would require a programming solution that relies interacting with
the target application’s user interface, which is likely much less efficient and potentially
more complex that interacting directly with the API.
Finally, we have not even begun to address the inherent challenges in developing a mobile
application. In addition to considering the audience/user needs, we also need to consider OS
compatibility, battery use, performance and secure software development. Although these
challenges have all been mentioned or described at least indirectly, properly addressing
them is not trivial.
5.2.9 Concluding Remarks
Our research demonstrated the potential for ML steganography to be used as an anti-
censorshipmechanismwhile also highlighting key challenges. Perhaps the greatest challenge
to the implementation and widespread use of ML steganography is its apparent weakness
to a statistical steganalysis technique that analyzes the distribution of bit-errors. Images
can be checked in a limited amount of time with little computation, neutralizing the main
covertness benefit of using steganography. Although some forms of ML steganography may
be vulnerable to such attacks, more research is required to determine the extent to which
other ML steganography algorithms are vulnerable.
Although an adaptive, ML steganographic communications framework is challenging to
design and implement, it serves as an added security layer to more common encrypted
messaging platforms. Encrypted messaging applications typically advertise their encryp-
tion capabilities and are blocked in many authoritarian countries. As citizens around the
world become more tech-savvy and privacy conscious, embracing decentralized finance
and communication networks, the demand for privacy-enabling anti-censorship technology
will only increase. The development and proliferation of such technology would enable free
and open communication in support of democratic values and would be beneficial for not
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only the United States and like-minded nations, but also for anyone in the world who values
individual freedom, no matter where they live.
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